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   Abstract 
This thesis consists of four papers: two of them deal with the relationship between consumption, energy taxation, and 
emissions on macro level, and two of them focus on the effects of changes in consumption and income on the 
environmental quality on a micro level. 
The main objective of paper [I] is to examine how exogenous technological progress, in terms of an increase in energy 
efficiency, affects consumption choice by Swedish households and thereby emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur 
dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx). The aim of the paper is closely related to the discussion of what is known as 
the “rebound effect”. To neutralize the rebound effect, we estimate the necessary change in CO2 tax, i.e. the CO2 tax 
that keeps CO2 emissions at their initial level. In addition, we estimate how this will affect emissions of sulphur dioxide 
and nitrogen oxides. The results indicate that an increase in energy efficiency of 20 percent will increase emissions of 
CO2 by approximately 5 percent. To reduce the CO2 emissions to their initial level, CO2 tax must be raised by 130 
percent. This tax increase will reduce the emissions of sulphur dioxide to below their initial level, but will leave the 
emissions of nitrogen oxides at a higher level than initially. 
One of the premises implied in paper [II] is that the changes in consumer prices, as a result of changes in 
environmental taxes, may send a different signal to the consumer compared with other changes in consumer prices, 
such as changes in producer price. In addition, this assumed difference in the signaling effect of the changes in 
environmental taxes, compared to changes in the producer price, may also differ between different commodities. To 
achieve the objectives a system of demand functions for Swedish households is estimated. To test for the signaling 
effect of environmental taxes the consumer price for energy goods is partitioned into a producer price part and a tax 
part. 
In Paper [III], we estimate the income elasticity of demand for recreational services and other traditional groups of 
goods in Sweden and we test for potential changes in such estimates over the twentieth century. The paper uses 
Swedish household surveys for the years 1913, 1984, 1988, and 1996. Because of the difficulty of directly observing 
the demand for recreational services, we employ an indirect methodology by using the demand for some outdoor goods 
as proxies for the recreational services demand. 
 In paper [IV], we investigate the relationship between pollution and income at the household level. Here we want to 
investigate, and hence contribute to the existing literature, under what conditions concerning individual preferences and 
the link between consumption and pollution a linear relationship is to be expected, but also to empirically assess the 
relationship. To achieve our objective we formulate a model determining different type of households’ choice of 
consumption for goods. Furthermore we link the demand model to emission functions for the various goods. The 
results from the empirical analysis show that, at least in a close neighborhood of observed income/pollution, we can 
reject linearity for all three types of pollutions, CO2, SO2, and NOx. According to our results the pollution/income 
relationships are all strictly concave. Thus the implication is that the income distribution seems to matter in the sense 
that equalization of income will lead to higher emissions. Furthermore it is shown that the slope as well as the curvature 
differ between different types of households, which means that preferences differ across households. 
 
Keywords: Household consumption, energy demand, emissions, rebound effect, energy 
taxation, tax elasticities, environmental services, income elasticities, Engel Curves, income 
distribution. 
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   Income, Energy Taxation, and the Environment 
1. Introduction 
The four papers included in this thesis can be divided into two main parts. The first part 
consists of papers [I] and [II] and deals with the relationship between consumption, 
energy taxation, and emissions on the macro level. The second part focuses the role of 
income on changes in consumption environmental quality, and includes paper [III] and 
[IV]. This introduction presents the two parts and summarizes the corresponding papers 
along with a general discussion of the related research topics and relevant literature. 
1.1 The relationship between energy taxation, consumption and emissions.  
One of the most serious problems that the humanity faces today is the continuous 
deterioration of the natural environment. Environmental protection has been an intriguing 
and tough issue to most economists. In the development of economic theory 
environmental issues have mostly been viewed as market failures due to missing markets 
and, therefore, the suggested solutions have been public intervention through specific 
activities by governments (see Pigou, 1920 and Dasgupta and Heal, 1979). Since energy 
consumption is intrinsically contributing not only to production of goods and services, 
but also to pollution, it is believed that the consumers of energy must pay not only the 
energy market price, but also the marginal costs that are related to energy consumption. 
From this point of view, energy policy can effect energy demand and hence improve 
allocative efficiency. Energy saving is viewed as one important option for preventing 
emission of greenhouse gases. Furthermore, when energy saving is reducing the spatial 
and temporal density of energy consumption, it supports a rising market share of 
renewable energy sources (Barzantny et al., 2003). In addition, energy saving plays a role 
in reducing the vulnerability for import dependency and supply disruptions (Adriaan et 
al., 2006). Despite these virtues, energy saving and energy efficiency - as typical demand 
side options - appear to be harder to “sell” compared with other options that focus on the 
supply side such as Power station, high-voltage networks, and search for new oil 
reserves. 
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The application of efficiency improvement in order to achieve reductions in pollution and 
resource consumption have been on the political agenda since the early 1970s and is now 
frequently suggested as a measure towards the realization of a sustainable development 
(see e.g. World Commission on Environment and Development, 1986; United Nations, 
1995; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1995 and 1998). 
Recent advocates of efficiency improvements have also introduced new concepts. One 
example is Eco-efficiency, proposed by the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (1999) that introduced measures to reduce ecological impacts and resource 
intensity throughout the life cycle of goods and services.  
 
While emphasizing the importance of efficiency improvement the literature has, so far, to 
a large extent ignored the possibility of any “take-back” or rebound effects. Rebound can 
here be defined as economic forces (demand side effects) that over time weaken the 
potential (technical) savings associated with efficiency improvements.
1 One important 
cause of such effects is that higher efficiency reduces energy costs, which again increases 
demand. Khazzoom (1980, 1986, 1987, and 1989) and Khazzoom et al. (1990) discuss 
the significance of such effects. Khazzoom questions the adequacy of energy saving 
programs since greater efficiency could lead to increased, rather than decreased, energy 
demand. Khazzoom (1987) also presents criticism of Lovins (1985) for ignoring rebound 
effects when savings from more efficient mandated appliances were assessed. This again 
triggered a debate on the importance of rebound-effects (see for example Lovins 1988; 
Henly et al. 1988; Khazzoom 1989). The controversy reappeared a few years later in the 
context of fossil fuel consumption and emissions. A forerunner to this debate was a work 
by Manne and Richels (1990), who analyzed the economic costs arising from CO2 
emission limits. This study showed that the autonomous energy efficiency index (AEEI) 
had a dramatic impact on the economic cost of reducing CO2 emissions. Brookes (1990) 
considers efficiency improvements to be an inappropriate way of combating the 
greenhouse effect. In this thesis paper [I] examines the rebound effect using Swedish 
consumption data. More specifically it is investigated how exogenous technological 
                                                 
1  See Berkhout et al. (2000) for a definition of the rebound effect. A survey of the rebound effect 
can be found in Greening et al. (2000). 
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progress, in terms of an increase in energy efficiency, affects consumption choice by 
Swedish households and thereby emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide 
(SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx). 
 
Energy taxes become another reason for such concern regarding efficiency. Many 
economists have argued that both consumption and production of energy have 
contributed disproportionately to the generation of various pollution compared with other 
economic activities. Therefore taxing energy could be a sensible and righteous way to 
discourage environmentally demanding activities (see for example Goulder 1995 a and b 
and Parry 1997). On the other hand, energy taxes are relatively efficient instruments for 
obtaining government revenue in comparison with other taxes (Lee and Walter 1986). 
The main reason for the fiscal efficiency is that energy supply and demand are relatively 
inelastic in comparison with other commodities. Under these circumstances a tax on 
energy can potentially improve efficiency in both the environmental and fiscal 
dimension. Paper [II] is related to this strand of literature by examining consumer 
reaction to the introduction, or the change, of energy taxes for different commodities. The 
paper’s objective is to test if changes in the consumer price that results from the 
introduction, or change, in environmental taxes give a different signal to the consumer, 
compared to a change in the consumer price that results only from a producer price 
change. Understanding consumer response to environmental taxes for different 
commodities is believed to be critical to the environmental policy makers.  
Data used in paper [I] and [II]  
The data used in paper [I] are time-series data of Swedish consumption of non-durable 
goods for the period 1980-1997, and emission data related to consumption of each good. 
In paper [II], the time series are updated to cover the period 1980-2002, and also 
appended with data on energy taxation. The consumption data used are part of the 
Swedish National Account (SNA), and the emission data are part of the Swedish 
Environmental Accounts (SEA). 
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The consumption data we use in paper [I] and [II] are aggregated into four main 
commodity groups: food, transports, heating, and other non-durable goods. Expenditures 
on transportation are in turn divided into expenditure on petrol, car maintenance, and on 
public and other forms of transport. In the same way, expenditure on heating is divided 
into three different goods: electricity, oil, and district heating. Finally, other non-durable 
goods are divided into recreation goods, clothes, medical treatment, domestic appliances 
and other goods/services. 
1.2 The relationship between income, consumption and emissions. 
Through consumption, we maintain life and extract pleasure from the physical world. 
Consumption guarantees subsistence, but it affects the surrounding nature. There exists 
an intricate and sensitive balance between human activity and the environment. 
Resources are scarce; we must contemplate what is a good way of using them. We are 
forced to use them since without consumption there can be no life. Thus, we must accept 
that in order to maintain society people will consume parts of nature. Sometimes the 
consumption and usage can be detrimental to the state of nature. 
Johan Krutilla predicted in 1967 that people will demand more services of nature in the 
future (Krutilla, P.1967): 
“Given the phenomenal rise of car camping, if this activity will spawn a 
disproportionate number of future back-packers, canoe cruisers, cross-country 
skiers, etc., the greater will be the induced demand for wild, primitive, and 
wilderness-related opportunities for indulging such interest. Admittedly, we 
know little about the demand for outdoor experiences which will depend on 
unique phenomena of nature - its formation, stability, and probable course of 
development. These are important questions for research, results of which will 
have significant policy implications.” 
Paper [III] addresses the issue raised by Krutilla, by examining the demand for outdoor 
recreation in Sweden. If outdoor experience is, and always will remain, a luxury good, 
then the answer is trivial: demand will rise with income. However, little is known about 
demand for outdoor recreation. It is an empirical question whether outdoor experience is 
considered by consumers to be luxurious, and if it will stay so over time. Further, we do 
not know how changes and alterations of our surroundings will affect such demand. 
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Quality improvements of products, price reductions, introduction of substitutes and 
complements will affect such demand. Therefore, a study of such demand over time is 
worthwhile. Weitzman (1992), calls for estimates of demand structures, the debate about 
future limits to growth is ultimately an empirical one. The outcome depends upon deep 
structural parameters and assumptions about human behavior. In paper [III], we attempt 
to sketch a pattern of that demand that may have ramifications on policy. If Krutilla’s 
argument is still valid, the demand for nature services will increase and possibly justify 
proactive policy formation towards rehabilitation and protection of precious 
environments and nature attributes that provide valuable services. 
Related to Krutilla’s hypothesis is the notion of an environmental Kuznets curve. This 
curve shows an inverted U-shaped relation between pollution and per capita income, 
indicating that pollution increases in the early stages of economic development in a 
country up to a turning point, after which pollution starts to decrease with the increase in 
per capita income. The EKC idea has triggered a good deal of research, theoretical as 
well as empirical. The theoretical literature has focused mostly on assumptions regarding 
the relation between technology/preferences and emissions (Lopez, 1994, Selden and 
Song, 1995, McConell, 1997, Chichilnisky 1998, de Groot 1999). In general, empirical 
models are of a reduced form type using cross-country data (Grossman and Krueger, 
1995, Stern and Common, 2001).  
The recent literature in this area emphasizes the importance of the income distribution for 
the aggregate relation between pollution and income (see for example Stern, 1998, Torras 
& Boyce, 1998 and Heerink et al. 2001, Huang, 2005). The conclusion from these studies 
is that using mean income may lead to biased results due to skewed income distributions: 
Instead, the use of the median income is proposed (see Stern, 1998). According to 
Bimonte (2002), an increase in equity, measured by the Gini coefficient, shifts the EKC 
curve leftwards, implying a turning point at a lower income level. Heerink et al. (2001), 
on the other hand, get the opposite result for several environmental indicators analysed on 
a cross section of different countries. Thus, according to their results, there may be a 
trade off between income equality and environmental quality. More importantly, they 
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conclude that this effect may be due to a strictly concave pollution-income relation at the 
individual level. Paper [IV] investigates the relationship between pollution and income at 
the household level and relates this to aggregate emissions under different assumptions 
concerning the income distribution. The results indicate that pollution-income 
relationship for Swedish households is non-linear, implying that the income distribution 
matters. Thus in an analysis of the relation between economic growth and income for a 
country one has to consider how growth is distributed among the people in order to be 
able to say something about how aggregate emissions will change. 
Data used in paper [III] and [IV]  
The data used in paper [III] are cross-section data from four different Swedish Family 
Expenditure Surveys (FES), 1913, 1984, 1988, and 1996. The first household expenditure 
survey in Sweden was done in 1913. It covered approximately 900 households in eight 
towns. The 1984 survey included 4354 households, the 1988 survey 3764 households, 
and 1104 households was included in the 1996 survey. 
In paper [IV], we use the same cross-section data except for the 1913 survey. In this 
paper too, we make use of the emission data from the Swedish Environmental Accounts 
and link them to each type of non-durable good aggregate. For the choice of consumption 
of non-durable goods we aggregate household expenditure into eight goods (food, 
beverages, heating, petrol, other transportation, recreation, clothes and other non-durable 
goods). 
 
2. Summary of the papers 
Paper [I]: Increased Energy Efficiency and the Rebound Effect: Effects on 
Consumption and Emissions. 
The main objective of this paper is to examine how exogenous technological progress, in 
terms of an increase in energy efficiency, affects consumption choices made by Swedish 
households and thereby emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and 
nitrogen oxide (NOx). The aim of the paper is closely related to the discussion of what is 
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termed the “rebound effect”. To neutralize the rebound effect, we estimate the necessary 
change in CO2 tax, i.e. the CO2 tax that keeps CO2 emissions at their initial level. In 
addition, we estimate how this will affect emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxides. The results indicate that an increase in energy efficiency of 20 percent will 
increase emissions of CO2 by approximately 5 percent. To reduce the CO2 emissions to 
their initial level, the CO2 tax must be raised by 130 percent. This tax increase will reduce 
the emissions of sulphur dioxide to below their initial level, but will leave the emissions 
of nitrogen oxides at a higher level than initially. Thus, if marginal damages from sulphur 
dioxide and nitrogen dioxide are non-constant, additional policy instruments are needed. 
 
Paper [II]: Energy Taxes as a Signaling Device: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer 
Preferences. 
This paper presents an econometric study dealing with household demand in Sweden. 
The main objective is to empirically examine the differences in consumer reaction to the 
introduction of, or the change in, environmental taxes. The main focus is on 
environmental taxes as a signaling device. The hypothesis is that the introduction of an 
environmental tax provides new information about the properties, or the characteristics, 
of the directly taxed goods. This in turn may affect consumer preferences for these goods, 
hence altering the consumption choice. The results of the study show that changes in 
environmental taxes have a significant signaling effect on the demand for residential 
heating in the sense that the consumers are more sensitive to a tax change than a producer 
price change. The result from the econometric analysis also shows that all goods have 
negative own-price elasticities, and positive income elasticities. Concerning the signaling 
effect of environmental taxes the results are somewhat ambiguous. The tax elasticity for 
energy goods used for heating seems to be significantly higher than the traditional price 
elasticity, whereas the opposite seems to be the case for energy goods used for 
transportation. It may be the case that there are large differences between different types 
of households, depending on family size, income level, place of residence, etc., which is 
not captured using macro data. 
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Paper [III]: Demand for Environmental Quality: An Empirical Analysis of 
Consumer Behavior in Sweden. 
In this paper we estimate the income elasticity of demand for recreational services and 
other traditional groups of goods in Sweden and we test for potential changes in such 
estimates over the twentieth century. Because consumption of recreational services is not 
directly observed in the market, the paper employs an indirect methodology by using the 
demand for some outdoor goods as proxies for recreational services demand. Consistent 
with most prior research, our results confirm the expectation that recreational services, as 
a public good, represent a luxury good in Sweden. According to this result, the 
expenditure on environmental services increases with income. This is true when 
everything else is the same. When preferences, prices, nature attributes, and nature 
experience production structure change, it is difficult to predict the demand for 
environmental services in the future. Our results also show that the income elasticities for 
traditional goods are stable over time, which indicates that the consumer preferences for 
expenditure on these specific commodities are not changing over time.  
Paper [IV]: The Income-Pollution Relationship and the Role of Income 
Distribution: Evidence From Swedish Household Data. 
The main purpose with this study is to examine the relationship between pollution and 
income at the household level. The study is motivated by the recent literature 
emphasizing the importance of the income distribution for the aggregate relation between 
pollution and income. The main finding of previous studies is that if the individual 
pollution-income relationship is non-linear, then aggregate pollution, for say a whole 
country, will depend not only on average income, but also on how income is distributed. 
To achieve our objective we formulate a model determining different types of 
households’ choice of consumption for goods. Furthermore, we link the demand model to 
emission functions for the various goods. The theoretical analysis shows that unless we 
impose very restrictive assumptions on preferences and the emission functions, we can 
not a priori determine the slope or the curvature of the pollution-income relation. The 
empirical analysis shows that, given the model used, the pollution-income relation has a 
positive slope in Sweden and is strictly concave for all three pollutants under 
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consideration (CO2, SO2, NOx), at least in the neighborhood of the observed income for 
an average household. Furthermore the results show that the curvature of the relation 
differs between different types of households. We also show that altering the prevailing 
income distribution, given constant average income, will affect aggregate emissions in 
the sense that an equalization of incomes will give rise to an increase in emissions. One 
implication is that the development of aggregate pollution, due to growth, not only 
depends on the income level, but also on how growth is distributed. 
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Abstract
The main objective of this paper is to examine how exogenous technological progress, in terms of an
increase in energy efficiency, affects consumption choice by Swedish households and thereby emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx). The aim of the paper is closely
related to the discussion of what is termed the brebound effectQ. To neutralise the rebound effect, we
estimate the necessary change in CO2 tax, i.e. the CO2 tax that keeps CO2 emissions at their initial level. In
addition, we estimate how this will affect emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. The results
indicate that an increase in energy efficiency of 20% will increase emissions of CO2 by approximately 5%.
To reduce the CO2 emissions to their initial level, the CO2 tax must be raised by 130%. This tax increase
will reduce the emissions of sulphur dioxide to below their initial level, but will leave the emissions of
nitrogen oxides at a higher level than initially. Thus, if marginal damages from sulphur dioxide and nitrogen
dioxide are non-constant, additional policy instruments are needed.
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1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to examine how exogenous technological progress, in
terms of an increase in energy efficiency, affects consumption choice by Swedish households
and thereby emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide
0140-9883/$ - see front matter D 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V.
doi:10.1016/j.eneco.2005.09.003
* Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Umea ˚ University, SE-901 87 Umea ˚, Sweden.
E-mail address: runar.brannlund@econ.umu.se (R. Bra ¨nnlund).
Energy Economics xx (2005) xxx–xxx
www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco
ENEECO-01366; No of Pages 17
+ modelARTICLE IN PRESS
(NOx). The aim of the paper is closely related to the discussion of what is known as the brebound
effectQ. Briefly, the rebound effect can be described as the direct and indirect effects, such as
substitution and income effects, induced by a new energy-saving technology. This rebound effect
may then partly, or entirely, offset the initial or direct energy saving resulting from a new
technology. As a consequence, the effects on emissions become less clear-cut. A second
objective is to estimate the change of the shadow price of CO2 emissions in a scenario where we
have an exogenous change in energy efficiency, and where we maintain CO2 emissions at their
initial level. A third objective is to estimate the effects on SO2 and NOx emissions of a policy
maintaining CO2 emissions at their initial level.
The motivation for our paper is threefold. The first can be traced to the existing literature on
the rebound effect (RE). The RE is usually discussed in connection with bnew energy-saving
technologyQ. A new energy-saving technology essentially implies a lower energy bill, which can
be viewed as a reduction of the real price of energy services. Thus, if petrol costs less per
transport unit, car use may increase, which partially offsets the initial energy-saving potential.
Furthermore, lower energy costs increase real income, which leads to an increase in consumption
of other goods. This in turn offsets the emission reductions from the initial energy saving. A
third effect may be denoted general equilibrium effects, since changes in aggregate consumption
patterns may lead to structural change and changes in relative prices. Taken together, these
effects can be denoted the rebound effect.
1 Related to this is the long-standing discussion of how
growth and technological progress affect the natural environment. On one side the argument has
been, and remains, that economic growth inevitably leads to more emissions and hence a
degradation of the natural environment (Meadows et al., 1972, 1992). On the other side, it has
been suggested that the traditional view of the relationship between growth and the environment
is too static with respect to technology and preferences, and that the combination of economic
growth and changes in preferences may lead to environmental improvements as a country
becomes wealthier. The latter argument can be traced to a report by the World Bank (World
Development Report 1992) showing that low income countries have relatively low emissions
and middle income countries high emissions, but that high income countries have low emissions.
Thus, the relationship between income and emissions is in the shape of an inverted U-curve. The
conclusion would then be that emissions will decrease as a country becomes wealthier. This U-
shaped curve is usually called the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).
A second motivation can be deduced from the Swedish commitment to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases, such as CO2. It should be evident that the policy necessary to fulfil such an
objective may differ substantially depending on technological progress, among other things.
Thus it is of interest to estimate the shadow price, or the necessary tax change, of CO2 under a
growth (or technological progress) scenario.
A third motivation follows from the increasing energy-saving efforts in Sweden, and
elsewhere in Europe, to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Subsidies for such efforts may
then, according to the discussion above, have a rebound effect that counteracts the direct
emission reduction potential through higher energy efficiency. By taking substitution and
income effects into account we may shed empirical light on this issue.
Our definition of efficiency improvements includes both new technology that replaces the old
capital stock, and new technology that makes the present capital stock more efficient. An
example of the latter would be a new motor oil that improves the efficiency of an engine.
1 See Berkhout et al. (2000) for a definition of the rebound effect. A survey of the rebound effect can be found in
Greening et al. (2000).
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To achieve our objectives, we formulate and estimate an econometric model for non-durable
consumer demand in Sweden that utilises macro data. The system of demand equations is
derived assuming cost-minimising households. The model employed here is essentially a three-
stage budgeting model with aggregate data from the Swedish national accounts. In the first stage,
it is assumed that the household determines how much to spend on non-durable goods and how
much to spend on durable goods (including savings). In the second stage, we assume that the
household allocates its total expenditure for non-durable goods on different non-durable
commodity aggregates or groups. Given the allocation for each non-durable commodity group,
households in the third stage allocate their group expenditures on the various goods within the
group. The resulting model is then used to simulate various changes in energy efficiency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss in greater detail how
consumption patterns and emissions are linked, as well as provide a description of the data used
in the analysis. The modelling framework as well as aggregation issues and the econometric
model are outlined in Section 3. Results from the econometric model are presented in Section 4,
and the result of the simulations is given in Section 5. The paper ends with a number of
concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Consumption and emissions
The data used in this study are time series data on Swedish consumption of non-durable
goods, and emission data linked to each type of good.
2 The consumption data we use here are
aggregated into four main groups: food, transport, heating, and other non-durable goods (see Fig.
1). Expenditures on transportation are in turn divided into car expenditures (petrol and
maintenance) and expenditure on public and other forms of transport (air, train and bus). In the
same way, expenditure on heating is divided into three different goods: electricity, fuels (oil and
solid fuels), and district heating. Finally, other non-durable goods are divided into recreation
goods, clothes and shoes, medical treatment, domestic appliances and other goods/services.
The goods considered give rise to various emissions. In this study we focus on emissions of
carbon dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides (NOx). Emissions from each
good are defined as:
Eikt ¼ hikt˜ x xit
where x ˜it is the real consumption of good i in period t, hikt is the emission of substance k per unit
of real consumption of good i in period t.
3 Index i defines goods, k=CO2,S O 2,N O x.







hikt˜ x x r ðÞi ðÞ t;





Erkt; k ¼ CO2;SO2;NOx
2 The complete data set can be found on the website http://www.econ.umu.se/~runar.brannlund/data_ee_2005.xls.
3 The emission coefficient hi measures the direct emissions from the households’ consumption of heating and transport.
For all other goods, the emission coefficients measure the indirect emissions from the households’ consumption, i.e. the
indirect emissions capture the emissions from the production of the goods that the household consumes.
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where eij is the price elasticity of good j with respect to price i. Similarly, we obtain the emission

































emissions of sulphur dioxide from car transport is the SO2 tax on petrol. In fact, the table reveals
that electricity has the largest share of sulphur dioxide emissions, amounting to about 24%.
During the sample period (1980–1997) there was a substantial substitution from oil to
electricity for domestic heating. For example, the expenditure share for both electricity and oil
Expenditure on non-durables



















Fig. 1. Three stage budgeting model.
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was about 40% of total expenditures on heating in 1980.
4 The corresponding figures for 1997
were 62% for electricity and 14% for oil. Although the expenditure share for oil declined sharply
over the sample period, its fraction of sulphur dioxide and CO2 emissions remained relatively
large.
From the table we also see that food consumption, with 19% of total expenditure, generates
relatively large emissions of sulphur dioxide and NOx. In relation to its share of expenditure,
recreation also constitutes a relatively large share of the emissions of sulphur dioxide and
NOx.
3. The econometric model
In our model we assume a three-stage budgeting process, as described in Fig. 1. In the first
stage total expenditures are allocated between durables and non-durables. The second stage
comprises the allocation of non-durable expenditure between four groups of goods, in this case
food, transportation, heating, and bother goodsQ. Finally, in the third stage, the consumer
allocates the group expenditure on individual goods within the group.
In the specification of the demand system, we apply Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980) Almost
Ideal Demand model (AID model).
5 Denoting budget shares by w, total expenditure on non-
durables by x, and group prices by p(r), we can write the demand for commodity group r in
budget share form as
w r ðÞ t ¼ a r ðÞþ
X 4
s¼i
c r ðÞs ðÞ lnp s ðÞ t þ b r ðÞlnxt   lnPt ðÞ ; r ¼ 1; N ;4 ð1Þ
4 Compared to total expenditures this amounts to 3%.
Table 1









Car transport 11.7 60.9 21.9 67.4
Public transport 1.5 1.9 1.5 4.2
Other transport 1.6 1.1 0.7 1.3
Electricity 5.0 7.2 24.5 2.9
Oil 1.2 11.1 13.8 2.6
District heating 1.8 3.2 10.9 1.3
Food 19.0 6.4 10.0 11.1
Beverage 6.9 0.6 1.2 0.7
Recreation 6.9 1.6 3.8 2.9
Clothes 7.5 0.8 1.4 0.9
Medical treatment 3.9 0.4 0.7 0.4
Domestic appliances 7.2 1.1 2.2 1.1
Other goods/services 25.8 3.6 7.6 3.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The emissions from transport and heating are direct, whereas the emissions from all other goods are indirect.
5 An advantage of this class of demand system is that it is less sensitive to multicolinearity in prices than for example
the Translog model. In addition, the AID model can be extended to include quadratic terms in the logarithm of
expenditures and still allow for exact aggregation. In Section 4, we present test statistics that suggest that the linear
specification is sufficient for our data.
R. Bra ¨nnlund et al. / Energy Economics xx (2005) xxx–xxx 5ARTICLE IN PRESS
where t denotes time. The price index, lnPt, is here defined as Stone’s price index, i.e.
lnPt=
P
rw(r)tlnp(r)t. Stone’s price index is also used to calculate the group price from the prices
within the group, lnP(r)t=
P
iw(r)itlnp(r)it, i=1,...,m(r).
The demand functions for the goods within the subgroups have the same functional form as
the demand equations for the main groups. The demand function for goods within the rth group
can accordingly be written as
w r ðÞ it ¼ a r ðÞ i þ
X mr ðÞ
j¼1
c r ðÞ ijlnp r ðÞ jt þ b r ðÞ i lnx r ðÞ t   lnp r ðÞ t
  
; i ¼ 1;N ;mr ðÞ ;r ¼ 1; N ;4 ð2Þ
where w(r)it is the within group budget share, lnp(r)j is the price index of the jth good, x(r)t
is total expenditure allocated to the rth group, and p(r)t is Stone’s price index for the rth
group.
Given this structure of weak separability, the econometric model consists of five separate
systems of budget share equations. In the estimation adding up, homogeneity and symmetry
restrictions are imposed for each demand system. With respect to the notation used for the main










Symmetry: crs ¼ crs; 8r;s
Given estimates of the parameters at each blevelQ, we can calculate price and expenditure
elasticities, totally and conditional on the expenditures for each group. Using the main group
notation and following Edgerton et al. (1996), the expenditure and uncompensated price
elasticities are:





crs   brws
wr
  drs ð4Þ
where Er denotes the expenditure elasticity and ers the uncompensated price elasticity; drs is
equal to one when r=s and zero elsewhere.
Let us denote the within group expenditure elasticity for the ith good within the rth group of
goods as E(r)i, the group expenditure elasticity for the rth group of goods as E(r), and the total
expenditure elasticity for the ith good within the rth group of goods as Ei, with an equivalent
definition for the budget shares, w. In this case, we can calculate the total expenditure elasticity
as
Ei ¼ E r ðÞ E r ðÞ i: ð5Þ
In the same way, we can denote the within group price elasticity between the ith and jth
goods within the rth group of goods as e(r)ij, the group price elasticity as e(r)(s) and the total price
elasticities as eij. The within group price elasticity assumes that group expenditure is unchanged
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in spite of the price change, while the total price elasticity allows for the relevant changes in
group expenditure, and is given by
eij ¼ drse r ðÞ ij þ E r ðÞ iw s ðÞ j drs þ e r ðÞs ðÞ
  
ð6Þ
If we look at Eq. (6) for two goods within the same group, we can see that the total price
elasticity consists of two components. The first part is a direct effect, which represents the
subgroup elasticity, while the second part is an indirect effect, which is a product of three factors.
The first measures the relative change in the group price index when the price of the jth good
changes (this is equal to w(r)j); the second factor measures the effect a change in the price index
has on group expenditure (1+e(r)(s)), while the third factor measures the effect this change in
within group expenditure has on the consumption of the ith good (E(r)i).
We can also observe that if the own between group price elasticity e(r)(r)= 1, then the group
expenditure is unaffected by the price change and eij=e(r)ij. On the other hand, if e(r)(r)=0, then
the price change produces a proportional effect on group expenditure.
Finally, we can note that alternative specifications of the demand system are also possible.
One alternative would be to include the service value of the durable goods as an additional
variable in the demand system, see for example Jorgenson and Slesnick (1987) and Slesnick
(1992). This approach requires that we can observe the value (or level) of the capital stock. This
information is not included in the national accounts nor, with the exception of cars, is it available
in other Swedish data sources. However, a large fraction of the capital stock that is assumed to
become more efficient is not owned by households. This is for example the case with planes,
buses and trains within the transport group, and for district heating plants, hydroelectric power
stations and nuclear power stations in the heating group.
Although the three-stage budgeting approach applied in this study may overestimate the
effects of the energy efficiency increase, as we do not account for the adjustment process in the
capital stock, the inclusion of a capital variable in the demand system does not necessarily imply
better estimates. Furthermore, if it were possible to find good estimates of the value of the capital
stock, we would also need to simulate the change in the value of the capital stock as a result of
the increased energy efficiency.
4. Econometric results
The estimation results using Swedish quarterly consumption data for the period 1980:1–
1997:4 are shown in Tables A1–A5 in Appendix A. Although the econometric model is based on
a static model that is linear in expenditure, we have tested more flexible models within the AID
family, such as the autoregressive model by Alessie and Kapteyn (1991) and the expenditure
quadratic model (QAIDS) by Banks et al. (1997). None of these specifications proved to be
superior to the model presented in Section 3.
For example is the p-value from a likelihood ratio (LR) test of a QAIDS model against a
linear model 0.27 at the second stage
6 of the demand system. For the subgroups at the third
stage, LR tests also suggest a linear expenditure specification for the food group [p-value
0.06] and the heating group [p-value 0.14], whereas the test statistics for the transport group
suggest a non-linear specification. However, the elasticities for car and public transport,
which account for the largest shares of greenhouse gas emissions, are close to each other in
6 I.e. the first estimated stage, where the equations for food, transportation and heating are included in the estimation of
the demand system.
R. Bra ¨nnlund et al. / Energy Economics xx (2005) xxx–xxx 7ARTICLE IN PRESS
the linear and non-linear models.
7 We have therefore chosen to apply a linear specification
for the total system.
To account for autocorrelation, a Newey-West estimator has been applied to calculate the
covariance matrix. Based on Box-Ljung tests the number of moving average terms is set to 4 in
these calculations. The results indicate that most of the estimated parameters are significantly
different from zero. However, the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions can generally be
rejected. The only exceptions are the subgroups for transportation and bother goodsQ, where
homogeneity cannot be rejected for the subgroup bother goodsQ and symmetry cannot be rejected
for the transport subgroup.
In terms of R-squared, the fit of the equations are relatively good, with an R-square higher
than 0.90 for all equations, except for food (0.80), district heating (0.76) and car transport (0.59).
Given the parameter estimates, expenditure and price elasticities have been calculated according
to Eqs. (3)–(6). The resulting elasticities are presented in Table 2.
The elasticities are evaluated at mean values for the final year of the sample. As the table
reveals, all own price elasticities have a negative sign. In most cases the own price elasticities lie
Table 2










Food  0.34 0.15
Heating  0.13 0.59
Transportation  0.09 0.99
Other  0.86 1.49
Food
Food(sub)  0.84 0.77  0.46 0.12
Beverages  1.16 1.61  0.88 0.25
Transports
Car transport  0.92 1.06  0.15 1.06
Public transport  0.09 0.52  0.04 0.52
Other transport  0.51 0.95  0.42 0.95
Heating
Electricity  0.71 0.83  0.24 0.49
District heating  0.31 1.39  0.05 0.82
Oil  0.93 1.17  0.79 0.69
Other
Clothes  0.52 1.29  0.49 1.90
Health care  0.21 0.31  0.21 0.45
Recreation  0.56 1.43  0.54 2.13
Domestic appliances  0.51 1.34  0.49 2.00
Other goods  0.66 0.81  0.61 1.21
The total own price and expenditure elasticities are calculated according to Eqs. (5) and (6).
7 In the QAIDS model the own price elasticity for car and public transport is estimated at  0.86 and  0.07
respectively, which can be compared to the own price elasticities from the linear model in Table 2 that amount to  0.92
and  0.09. The expenditure elasticities from the QAIDS model for car and public transport are 0.98 (1.06) and 0.60
(0.52), where the figures in parentheses refer to the estimates from the linear model.
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between 0 and  1, which implies that a higher price of a good (with the other prices held
constant) leads to an increase of the budget share for the same good, in spite of lower
consumption of that good. Moreover, all goods have positive expenditure elasticities, implying
that they are considered as normal goods.
The first column of Table 2 shows that the demand for bheatingQ and btransportationQ is
relatively insensitive to changes in the own price. For example, if the price of btransportQ
increases by 10%, btransportQ demand will decrease by 0.9%. A corresponding increase in the
price for bheatingQ reduces the demand for bheatingQ by 1.3%. Among the four different main
groups, bother goodsQ have both the highest own price elasticity,  0.86, and the highest
expenditure elasticity, 1.49. As one might expect, the table reveals a relatively low expenditure
elasticity for food. The results also suggest that transport demand will increase at about the same
rate as total expenditures, as the expenditure elasticity for transportation is close to unity.
Although the within group own price elasticity for car transport is relatively high ( 0.92), the
total own price elasticity for car transport becomes much lower ( 0.15) as a result of the low
price elasticity for the transportation group. The within group expenditure elasticities and the
total expenditure elasticities for the goods within the transportation group are, on the other hand,
almost identical since the expenditure elasticity for transportation is close to one.
Within bheatingQ we find that oil has the highest total own price ( 0.79), while district
heating has the lowest ( 0.05). The highest total expenditure elasticities are found for clothes,
recreation and domestic appliances. These results are what we might expect, i.e. that appliances
and recreation are more of a luxury good than for example food.
The elasticities found in this study are in line with elasticities in other studies on Swedish
data. Wall (1991) estimates for example the own price elasticity for petrol to be in the interval
 0.10 to  0.15. Based on time series data from the national accounts, Hansson-Brusewitz
(1997) estimates the own price elasticities for car transportation to be  0.15, public transport
 0.39, electricity  0.32, and heating (district heating plus oil)  0.10. Bra ¨nnlund (1997), who
also uses time series data from the national accounts, estimates the own price elasticity for petrol
to be  0.13, public transport  0.25, other transport  0.52, electricity  0.10, district heating
 0.01 and oil  0.19.
5. Simulations
The objective of the simulations is to illustrate the effects of how exogenous technological
progress, in terms of increased energy efficiency, affects consumption and emissions. A new
energy-saving technology essentially implies a reduction in the energy cost per unit, which can
be seen as a reduction of the price of energy services. This is also the approach taken in the
simulations, where increased energy efficiency is modelled as a price reduction. As mentioned in
the Introduction, this will have several effects. One is the price effect, which means that car use
may increase if engines become more efficient and the cost of travel decreases, which partly
offsets the initial energy-saving potential. Another effect is the income effect: a reduced cost for
energy services increases real income, which in turn implies increased demand for the bownQ
good and other goods. With the simulated change in energy efficiency, we also calculate the
necessary change in CO2 tax to hold CO2 emissions at their initial level, and show how this
affects emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.
In the simulations we assume a 20% increase in energy efficiency for the goods within the
transport and heating groups. Since the cost of petrol amounts to 50% of the costs for car
transport, the price for car transport is reduced by 10%. As we do not know the production
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function for public transport and other transport, we assume that 20% of the price of public
transport consists of energy goods; the corresponding figure for other transport is 30%.
A 20% increase in energy efficiency is basically an ad hoc assumption for illustration
purposes only and is not based on any explicit policy goal. However, according to official
statistics, the energy efficiency of the Swedish economy has increased by approximately 20%
since 1980, indicating that the figure used has some relevance.
5.1. Simulation of increased energy efficiency
In the description of the simulation model, we first consider the simulation of increased
energy efficiency whereupon we describe the simulation of the change in CO2 taxation. Defining




i 1   ki ðÞ ; ð7Þ





w r ðÞi ðÞlnp1
i ; ð8Þ
where, as previously, w(r)(i) is good i’s initial share of total expenditures on goods in group r.




w r ðÞ lnp1
r ð9Þ
where w(r) is group r’s initial share of total consumption expenditures. It should be noted that we
do not allow for possible general equilibrium effects, i.e. we assume that efficiency effects and
taxes are shifted completely onto consumer prices. At least for energy goods, such as petrol, this
may not be an unreasonable assumption since these goods are traded on international
competitive markets.
8
Substituting expressions (8) and (9) into the demand system representing the first-stage
budgeting process gives us the new allocation across the different commodity groups. That
is:
w1
r ðÞ¼ ˆ a a r ðÞþ
X
s
ˆ c c r ðÞs ðÞ lnp1
s þ ˆ b b r ðÞ lnx0   lnP1   
þ ˆ e e0
r ðÞ ; ð10Þ
where a ^ denotes an estimate. The superscript 0 indicates the point of reference, which
means that total expenditures are fixed. The last term in Eq. (10), E ˆ(r)
0 , represents
unexplained time-specific effects not accounted for in the estimations, which are assumed to
remain constant over the simulations.
Given the new group shares, according to Eq. (10), we get by definition the new expenditure
on each group as:
x1
r ðÞ¼ w1
r ðÞ x ð11Þ
8 This, however, is only valid if energy efficiency improves solely in Sweden. If energy efficiency changes globally we
will certainly have an additional effect.
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Substituting Eq. (11) into the demand system representing the second stage of the budgeting
process, we get:
w1
r ðÞi ðÞ¼ ˆ a a r ðÞi ðÞþ
X
j
ˆ c c r ðÞj ðÞ lnpi
j þ ˆ b b r ðÞi ðÞ lnx1
r ðÞ  lnp r ðÞ
1
  
þ ˆ e e0
r ðÞ : ð12Þ
From (12) we can now define the change in real expenditure on good i as:
















hikD˜ x xi; k ¼ CO2;SO2;NOx
The results from the simulated increase in energy efficiency are presented in Table 3, where
the first column shows the results from increased energy efficiency for transport. The second
column shows the effects of increased energy efficiency in heating, while the third column
describes the effects when both transport and heating become more efficient. The remaining
three columns show the percentage change in consumption and emissions of sulphur dioxide and
NOx from increased energy efficiency and increased CO2 taxation to hold CO2 emissions at their
initial level.
5.2. Simulation of the tax change
The simulation of the tax change resembles to a large degree the simulation for increased
energy efficiency. The percentage price change on good i due to a change in the tax is calculated






















where the superscript denotes tax regime (0 is baseline tax), t is the VAT rate for good i, and s is
the excise duty on good i. The excise duty, in turn, consists of an energy tax (SEK/kWh) and a
CO2 tax that is levied on the CO2 content in fuels. It should be noted that s˙shows the excise duty
share of the producer price (price excluding taxes) and that it includes all energy-related indirect
taxes. The price level for good i after the tax change and increased energy efficiency is then
equal to:
p2









The simulation then follows the same procedure as before, where we start by calculating the
new Stone price index for commodity group r=1, ..., n according to Eq. (8). The CO2 tax is
then changed until DECO2=0.
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5.3. Simulation results
In this section we present the results of the simulations. The first column presents the results
from an increased energy efficiency in the transport sector of 20%, which given our
assumptions lowers the price of car transport by 10%, public transport by 4% and other
transport by 6%. As a consequence of increased energy efficiency in the transport sector, the
expenditure share for transport will decline. However, since the weighted prices for transport
have declined (by 9%), real expenditures on transport increase by 0.5%. The increased real
expenditures on transport and changed relative prices within the transport group result in a
lower budget share for car transport and increased budget shares for public and other forms of
transport.
Table 3
Percentage change in demand and emissions due to an increase in energy efficiency of 20% for transport and heating








DCar transport 0.92 4.18 5.53 0.21 1.68 1.91
DPublic transport  0.42 2.00 1.85  0.38 1.36 1.21
DOther transport  1.76 3.74 2.26  1.32 3.74 2.78
DElectricity 2.09 0.84 3.43 1.03  0.81 0.69
DOil 2.94 1.18 4.85  3.48  10.51  14.42
DDistrict heating 3.41 1.37 5.64 4.40 3.66 8.88
DFood  1.09 1.58 0.48  0.76 2.30 1.62
DBeverage  2.24 3.28 1.00  1.57 4.78 3.36
DRecreation 3.98 1.18 5.19 2.14  2.63  1.27
DClothes 3.60 1.07 4.69 1.94  2.38  1.15
DMedical treatment 0.82 0.25 1.06 0.45  0.58  0.28
DDomestic appliances 3.73 1.11 4.86 2.01  2.46  1.19
DOther goods/services 2.23 0.67 2.90 1.20  1.49  0.72
DCO2
Transport group 0.83 4.10 5.36 0.17 1.71 1.91
Heating group 2.72 1.10 4.49  0.79  5.14  5.86
Provisions group  1.19 1.73 0.53  0.79 2.35 1.66
Diverse group 2.91 0.87 3.79 1.57  1.93  0.93
Total effect 1.26 3.05 4.72 0 0 0
DSO2
Transport group 0.76 4.03 5.21 0.13 1.72 1.89
Heating group 2.62 1.06 4.32 0.51  2.54  1.73
Provisions group  1.21 1.76 0.54  0.79 2.36 1.67
Diverse group 2.93 0.87 3.81 1.58  1.94  0.94
Total effect 1.79 1.82 4.03 0.44  0.87  0.35
DNOx
Transport group 0.79 4.05 5.26 0.15 1.70 1.89
Heating group 2.67 1.07 4.40  0.09  3.74  3.63
Provisions group  1.16 1.68 0.51  0.78 2.33 1.65
Diverse group 3.10 0.92 4.04 1.67  2.05  0.99
Total effect 0.88 3.30 4.53 0.15 1.09 1.24
DCO2 tax 36.25 76.30 134.20
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Due to the lower cost of petrol per mile, the demand for car transport will increase by 0.9%
in breal unitsQ (see Table 3). At the same time, there is a reduction in the real demand for
public and other transport by 0.4 and 1.8% respectively. The increased energy efficiency in the
transport sector leads to higher consumption of heating and other goods, while the
consumption of foodstuffs decreases. The reduced consumption of food and beverages is a
result of a negative cross-price effect.
Within the heating group the largest demand change is found for district heating,
which increases by 3%. The largest demand change in the bother goodsQ group is for
recreation, which increases by 4%. To sum up, the simulation indicates that the
improved energy efficiency in the transport sector will increase the emissions of CO2 by
1.3%, SO2 by 1.8% and NOx by approximately 0.9%. If there were no rebound effect,
CO2 emissions would decrease by 6.2%, and SO2 and NOx would decrease by 2.3%
and 7.0% respectively. Thus the rebound effect increases carbon dioxide emissions by
7.5% and sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxide by 4.1% and 7.9% respectively (see also
Table 4).
The second column in Table 3 summarises the simulation results of a 20% increase in
energy efficiency for heating. As the table suggests, this scenario will increase the demand
for every good in the demand system. The largest increases are for car transport and other
transport, which increase by 4.2% and 3.7% respectively. As a result of the increased
demand for transport services, the emissions of CO2 and especially NOx rise more in this
scenario than the previous one. Although the sources of changes in SO2 emissions differ
considerably between the first and second scenarios, the total change in SO2 is about the
same for both. However, the rebound effect for sulphur dioxide differs substantially between
the first and second scenarios, amounting to approximately 12% in the second scenario. The
rebound effect for carbon dioxide is about the same level in this scenario as in the first,
amounting to 7.4%. Compared to the previous scenario, we find a smaller rebound effect of
4.7% for NOx in this scenario.
In the third scenario, Column 3, we consider a 20% increase in energy efficiency for
both transportation and heating. Here we find the highest demand changes for district
heating (5.6%), car transport (5.5%) and recreation (5.2%) as a result of lower costs for
energy goods and increased real expenditures. The increased energy efficiency will in
this case increase the emissions of CO2 and NOx by 4.5%, while SO2 emissions will
increase by approximately 4%. For all emission categories, the largest change is found
for the transport group. In this scenario, the rebound effects for CO2 amount to
approximately 15%. The corresponding figures for SO2 and NOx are 16% and 13%
respectively.
Table 4
The estimated rebound effect in percent
Percentage change Transport Heating Transport and heating
DCO2 7.5 7.4 15.3
DSO2 4.1 11.6 16.1
DNOx 7.9 4.7 12.9
The rebound effect is calculated as the difference between a scenario where the increased energy efficiency of 20%
reduces the emissions from the sector without considering the substitution and income effects and the corresponding
scenario in Table 2, where these effects are accounted for.
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The final three columns in Table 3 consider the CO2-neutral case, i.e. CO2 emissions are held
at their initial level by changes to the CO2 tax. In other words, we increase the CO2 tax for each
scenario in Columns 1 to 3 until we obtain a zero change in the CO2 emissions. For the transport
scenario, we have to increase the CO2 tax by 36% to achieve the same level of CO2 emissions as
before the increase in energy efficiency. The increased CO2 tax also reduces SO2 and NOx
emissions. However, the net effect is still positive for SO2 and NOx. As the table reveals, the
largest demand change is for oil. As a consequence of the decreased demand for oil, the emission
of CO2 is reduced by 0.8% for the heating group, counteracting the increased emission of CO2
from the transport and bother goodsQ groups.
For the heating scenario, we must increase the CO2 tax by about 75% to achieve zero change
in CO2 emissions. As in the transport scenario, we find the largest demand change for oil.
However, we also find a demand reduction for the goods in the bother goodsQ group, among
other things as a result of lower real expenditures due to the tax increase. Among the goods in
the bother goodsQ group, we find the largest demand change for recreation ( 2.6%). In this
scenario, there is a reduction in CO2,S O 2 and NOx emissions from both the heating and the
bother goodsQ group. In this scenario we also find a reduction in the total emissions of SO2 while
the emissions of NOx still increase.
The general pattern from the previous scenario is also repeated in the final scenario
(Column 6), where we consider efficiency improvements for both transport and heating with
no change in CO2 emissions. In this scenario we must increase the CO2 tax by about 135%.
As in the previous scenario, demand decreases for oil ( 14%) and the goods in the bother
goodsQ group. The demand for all other goods in the demand system increases. As can be seen
for the goods in the heating group, this scenario indicates a substitution from oil to district
heating.
Although the goods in the bother goodsQ group have relatively low emissions of CO2 per unit,
the last two simulations indicate that these goods will nevertheless be subject to a relatively large
demand reduction. As in the previous scenario (Scenario 5), the increased CO2 tax reduces the
emissions of SO2 to a level below their initial level. As for all the other scenarios, the change in
NOx emissions is still positive in this last scenario. Thus additional policy instruments would be
needed to hold NOx unchanged or to reduce it.
Among the goods that are not directly affected by the increase in energy efficiency, we
generally find the greatest impact on recreational demand. In the first three scenarios we find the
largest demand change when the simulation involves improved energy use in the transport
sector—for example, recreational demand increases by 4% and 5% in Scenarios 1 and 3.
However, in the fourth scenario, too, where the increased energy efficiency in the transport
sector is counteracted by a higher carbon dioxide tax, there is a positive effect on recreational
demand.
In the final scenario, where we have increased energy efficiency in both the transport and
heating sectors, in combination with a higher CO2 tax, recreational demand is reduced by fully
1%. Thus in the scenario that seems most likely to appear in real world, with improved
technology in both the transportation and heating sectors and increased CO2 taxes, recreational
demand will be negatively affected.
6. Conclusion and discussion
The main objective of this study was to examine how an exogenous change in energy
efficiency affects consumption choice by Swedish households and thereby emissions of carbon
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dioxide (CO2), sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx). Initially an improvement in
energy efficiency implies lower consumption of energy goods, and thus lower emissions.
However, this also means that the real relative prices between goods are altered, and that real
income increases, the latter due to the initial reduction in energy costs. Thus it may very well be
the case that the initial energy saving is counteracted by these changes in real relative prices and
income. In the literature these latter effects are denoted brebound effectsQ. The magnitude of this
rebound effect is, however, an empirical issue, which will depend on consumers’ preferences for
the various goods.
In this particular empirical application, we have shown that the brebound effectQ can be
considerable. That is, the initial emission reduction due to an increase in energy efficiency
is more than counteracted by changes in consumption. The main conclusion, then, is that
an exogenous increase in energy efficiency may not lead to lower energy consumption,
and hence lower emissions. On the contrary, it is very likely that this bgrowth effectQ will
result in higher emissions. Furthermore, the results show that the CO2 tax change
necessary to counteract and hold CO2 emissions constant is quite large, 135%. In addition,
we show that an increase in energy efficiency will also lead to changes in other emissions,
such as sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. A policy of holding CO2 emissions at their
initial level will also affect the emissions of sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide, but not
to the same extent as the change in CO2 emissions. Thus, if marginal damages from
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides are non-constant, additional policy instruments are
needed.
Related to the issue of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), the empirical findings
in this study may be discouraging, since technological progress in terms of increased
energy efficiency tends to increase emissions. However, in the model used here there is no
preference-driven bpolicy responseQ as a result of technological progress. That is, the
increase in real income, due to the exogenous increase in energy efficiency, may increase
the demand for public goods, inherited in for example brecreational goodsQ. This increase
in demand, however, does not spill over into policy changes in our simulations. Thus, if
there really exists an EKC for CO2 emissions in Sweden
9, the CO2 tax necessary to keep
CO2 emissions at their initial level may be interpreted as the willingness to pay for emission
reductions.
Although the simulation model can handle the substitution and income effects that
increased energy efficiency generates, the model is not able to handle the general
equilibrium effects that may arise as a result of technological progress. Whether these
effects are large or not is difficult to say, but future research in this direction may be of
interest.
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Appendix A
Table A1











Food 1.8 (45.3) 0.11 (14.5)  0.04 ( 8.7) 0.007 (1.3)  0.22 ( 38.6) 0.98 2.18
Heating 0.32 (4.4) 0.66 (11.6)  0.02 ( 4.4)  0.03 ( 3.2) 0.94 1.72
Transportation 0.14 (2.8) 0.13 (15.3)  0.0008 ( 0.13) 0.95 1.94
t-values within parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation.
Table A2
Demand system parameter estimates for 1980–1997 in the food subgroup
Constant Price of food Expenditure coefficient R-squared Durbin-Watson
Food 1.7 (5.8) 0.02 (1.8)  0.16 ( 3.3) 0.80 0.57
t-values within parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation.
Table A3








Car transportation 0.5 (8.9) 0.1 (6.6)  0.07 ( 8.4) 0.05 (4.8) 0.59 1.09
Public transportation 0.34 (10.3) 0.08 (18.02)  0.05 ( 7.6) 0.91 1.37
t-values within parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation.
Table A4








Electricity 1.1 (7.9) 0.11 (4.7)  0.1 ( 8.7)  0.11 ( 3.8) 0.94 1.95
District heating  0.11 (0.63) 0.16 (9.7) 0.08 (2.06) 0.76 1.01
t-values within parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation.
Table A5





















































t-values within parenthesis are robust to autocorrelation.
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Energy taxes as a signaling device: An empirical analysis of
consumer preferences
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Abstract
This paper presents an econometric study dealing with household demand in Sweden. The main objective is to empirically examine the
differences in consumer reaction to the introduction of, or the change, in environmental taxes. Main focus is on environmental taxes as a
signaling device. The hypothesis is that the introduction of an environmental tax provides new information about the properties of the
directly taxed goods. This in turn may affect consumer preferences for these goods, hence altering the consumption choice. The result
from the econometric analysis shows that all goods have negative own-price elasticities, and positive income elasticities. Concerning the
signalling effect of environmental taxes the results are somewhat ambiguous. The tax elasticity for energy goods used for heating seems to
be signiﬁcantly higher than the traditional price elasticity, whereas the opposite seems to be the case for energy goods used for
transportation.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Keywords: Household demand; Energy tax; Tax elasticities
1. Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to empirically
examine consumer reactions as a response to the introduc-
tion of, or the change in, environmental taxes for different
groups of commodities. Understanding consumer response
to environmental taxes for different commodities is
believed to be critical to the environmental policy makers.
One of the premises implied in this study is that the
changes in consumer prices, as a result of changes in
environmental taxes, may send a different signal to the
consumer compared with other changes in consumer
prices, such as changes in producer price. In addition, this
assumed difference in the signalling effect of the changes in
environmental taxes, compared to changes in the producer
price, may also differ between different commodities
(Berkhout et al., 2004).
1
Over the last decade and, particularly, after the frame-
work Convention on Climate Change of 1992, many
OECD countries have considered the introduction of
‘‘Green Tax Reforms’’ aimed at reducing the emission
of green house gases. The reduction is usually used to
measure the effectiveness of environmental taxes (OECD,
2000). OECD (2003) emphasizes the need for more
research that examines the magnitude of the behavioural
response of consumers to environmental taxes once they
have been introduced. Such behavioural response is
considered to be a necessary precondition for the
correct implementation of different instruments of any
environmental policy. For a better understanding of
this behavioural response, it is essential to empirically
examine consumer reactions to the introduction of, or
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1The signalling effect may not be due to the tax change itself, but rather
the tax change comes in a combination with information and campaigns,
(footnote continued)
which alters consumer preferences. For an analytical analysis of the
signalling effect in tax policy, see for example, Barigozzi and Villeneuve
(2004).Behavioural response to environmental taxes can be
estimated ex ante (predicted value) or ex post (actual
values). The latter approach concentrates on the absolute
reduction in consumption caused by the introduction or
the increase of an environmental tax in a speciﬁc country at
a speciﬁc time (Agnolucci, 2004). The ex ante approach
uses econometric methods to estimate price elasticities,
which, with precaution, are used to predict behavioural
responses to environmental taxes (Garcia-Cerruti, 2000;
Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001).
In this paper, we formulate and estimate an econometric
model for non-durable consumer demand in Sweden that
utilises macro data. The system of demand equations is
derived assuming cost-minimising households. The em-
ployed model is essentially a three-stage budgeting model
with aggregate data from the Swedish National Accounts.
In the ﬁrst stage it is assumed that the household
determines how much to spend on non-durable goods
and how much to spend on durable goods (including
savings). In the second stage it is assumed that the
household allocates its total expenditure for non-durable
goods on different non-durable commodity aggregates, or
groups. Given the allocation on each non-durable com-
modity group, households in the third stage allocate their
group expenditures on the various goods within the group.
Our model is based on Deaton and Muellbauer’s (1980)
almost ideal model (AIDS).
Speciﬁc in our modelling approach is the hypothesis of
taxes as a signalling device. To account for this the
consumer price is divided into a producer price part and a
tax part. Given this partition, it enables us to estimate
separate effects; a producer price effect and a tax effect. We
also want to conduct tests of structural stability of the
demand system for the entire sample period. It is important
to check the stability of the model, since if it is unstable, it
will be difﬁcult to interpret the regression results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section
2 we illustrate the design and purpose of the energy and
environmental taxes introduced in Sweden. Section 3
describes the demand system, the data, as well as the
estimation and test approach. Section 4 discusses the
results. Finally, in Section 5 we draw some conclusions.
2. Energy and environmental taxation in Sweden
Environmental effects caused by energy generation and
consumption are signiﬁcant because of the widespread use
of fossil fuels in the economic system. The magnitude of
these effects is of concern, particularly in the case of
climate change, but also due to other external costs related
to fossil fuel use.
Sweden has used taxes on energy since 1929, when a tax
on gasoline was introduced. Electricity has been taxed since
1951, followed by a broadening of energy taxes in 1957.
The motivation underlying these taxes was purely ﬁscal.
Propelled by the global energy crisis in the 1970s; energy
taxes were increasingly motivated by a desire to discourage
consumption of fossil fuels. Thus, increased tax on oil
products were coupled with a signiﬁcant expansion of
electricity supply in order to promote a different proﬁle of
energy consumption.
In the eighties, environmental concerns entered the
discussion, manifested by the introduction of a tax
differentiation of leaded gasoline in 1986. This was
followed by the Environmental Tax Commission that
recommended a rich array of environmental taxes in their
proposal. New primarily environmental taxes, introduced
in the 1991 tax reform, include a carbon dioxide tax on
fossil fuel, and a sulphur tax on coal and oil. In addition,
the VAT has been extended to all fuels, and a nitrogen
dioxide tax is charged on emissions from large combustion
plants (Bra ¨ nnlund and Kristro ¨ m, 1997). Another green tax
reform was discussed with the appointment of the Swedish
‘‘Green Tax Commission’’ (SOU 1997, p.11). The Green
Tax Commission’s main objective was to analyse the
potential of ﬁscally neutral green tax reforms. The
prospects in mind were that there may exist a ‘‘double
dividend’’ (Bra ¨ nnlund and Nordstro ¨ m, 2004).
2
This idea of a green tax swap was decided upon during
spring 2000. It was decided that a switch from taxes on
labour to environmental taxation amounting to 30 billion
SEK will be carried out during the following 10 years. The
main taxes considered are the CO2 tax and the energy tax
on electricity.
The development of the general energy tax, as a share of
consumer price, is displayed Fig. 1. Here we can see that
the tax share on oil for heating has increased from
approximately 10% of the consumer price in 1980, to
approximately 50% in 2002. The tax on electricity shows a
similar pattern.
3. The model
In this section we formulate the demand system for non-








































Fig. 1. Energy tax as a share of total price in Sweden, 1980–2002.
2The ‘‘double dividend’’ will not be discussed in this work. For a review
of this issue, see for example, Bovenberg (1999) and Scho ¨ b (2003).
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3 In the ﬁrst stage,
the household decides on its leisure consumption, savings
and investments (durable consumer goods). In the second
stage, the household determines, given its total budget,
how much to spend on food, heating, transports, and other
goods. In the third stage, the household allocates resources
within each of these groups. For, example, given a speciﬁc
amount of money to be spent on transports, the household
determine how much that should be allocated to expendi-
ture on gasoline, car maintenance, and public and other
transport. In the same manner the household determines in
the third stage how to use its budget for heating. In this
case the household can choose between electricity for
heating, oil for heating and district heating. Our main
objective is to model and estimate household choices in the
second and third stage, with particular reference to energy
taxes.
Demand function estimates are also very useful as they
provide us with income and price elasticities. Consumers’
response to income and changes is required for the design
of many different policies; For example, policy design for
indirect taxation and subsidies requires knowledge of the
response for taxable commodities and services (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980). Such knowledge would normally be
obtained by the analysis of time series data on demand of
commodities, prices, and income.
We use the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS), ﬁrst
derived by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The advantages
of this system are well known. It gives an arbitrary ﬁrst
order approximation to any demand system, satisﬁes the
axioms of choice exactly, and is simple to estimate.
The AIDS assumes that consumer preferences fall within
the price-independent generalized logarithmic (PIGLOG)
class so that exact aggregation over consumers is possible.
In the AIDS model the budget share on a speciﬁc
commodity, or group of commodities, in relation to full
expenditure, can be written as
wi ¼ ai þ
X
j
gij ln pj þ bi lnðY=PÞ, (1)
where wi is the budget share for good i, pj is the price for
good j, Y is total expenditure on non-durable goods, P is
the consumer price index, and the parameters to be
estimated are a, g, and b. The consumer price index, P,i s




wj ln pj. (2)
In order to analyse the difference in the signalling effect
of the changes in environmental taxes compared to changes
in the producer price, we have to separate the consumer
price into a producer price part and energy tax part:
pj ¼ ¯ pjtj, (3)
where pj is the consumer price index for energy good j, ¯ pj
the producer price index for energy good j,a n dtj is the
energy tax index, which represents the environmental tax
for speciﬁc good. Using Eq. (3), we can calculate the energy
tax index by dividing the observed consumer price index on






Allowing for a difference in signalling effects, Eq. (1) can
now be written as






~ gij ln ti þ bi lnðY=PÞ. (5)
The budget share Eq. (5) includes two parameters
representing the consumer price, the ﬁrst one, gij,is the
coefﬁcient for the producer price index and the other, ~ gij,i s
the coefﬁcient for energy taxes index. In this case we can
capture the effect of energy taxes on the consumer
behaviour and see if there is any difference between the
parameters of energy taxes and the parameters of producer
price.
To obtain consistent estimates we have to assume that
under multi-stage budgeting the direct utility function is
weakly separable.
4 This approach implies that goods can
be divided into a number of separate groups, where a
change of the price of a good in one group affects the
demand for all goods in another group in the same manner.
If we have a three-stage budgeting process, the ﬁrst stage
comprises of allocation between saving durables and non-
durables goods. In the second stage, the household
allocates its total expenditure between n groups of non-
durable goods. In the third stage, the household allocates
its expenditure between m goods within each of the n
groups. Given this structure, the Linear Ideal Demand
System (LAIDS) model can be written in stochastic form as
wðrÞt ¼ aðrÞ þ
X n
s¼1
gðrÞðsÞ ln ¯ pðsÞt þ
X
s¼1
~ gij ln tðrÞðsÞ
þ bðrÞðln xt   ln PtÞþeðrÞt, ð6Þ
wðrÞit ¼ aðrÞi þ
X n
s¼1
gðrÞij ln ¯ pðrÞit þ
X
s¼1
~ gij ln tðrÞjt
þ bðrÞiðln xðrÞt   ln pðrÞtÞþeðrÞit, ð7Þ
where r ¼ 1;...;n denotes group, i ¼ 1;...;mðrÞ denotes
commodities within group r, and t ¼ 1;...;T denotes time
period. Eq. (6) thus describes the allocation between
groups, where w(r)t denotes the budget share for good r
in period t, ¯ pðrÞt is a group producer price index, xt is total
expenditure on non-durables, tðrÞt is the group energy
taxation index, and Pt ﬁnally is the consumer price index
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3In order to overcome the problem caused by the immense of goods and
services available to the consumer, we have this convenient assumption.
4This assumption implies that goods can be divided into a number of
separate groups, where a change of price in a good in one group affects the
demand for all goods in another group in the same manner.
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group, where wðrÞit is the within group budget share, ln ¯ pðrÞj
is the producer price index of the jth good, x(r)t is the total
expenditure allocated to the rth group, tðrÞjt is the energy
taxation index of goods j within group r, and p(r)t is the
stone price index for the rth group.
Given estimates of the parameters at each ‘‘level’’, we
can calculate price and expenditure elasticities, totally and
conditional on the expenditures for each group (Edgerton
et al., 1996).
5 Using the main group notation the
expenditure and uncompensated price elasticities are:
Er ¼ 1 þ
br
wr
; r ¼ 1;...;n, (8)
ers ¼




; r ¼ 1;...;n;s ¼ 1;...;n, (9)
~ ers ¼




; r ¼ 1;...;n;s ¼ 1;...;n, (10)
where Er denotes the expenditure elasticity for group r, ers
the uncompensated producer price elasticity, and ~ ers the
uncompensated energy taxation elasticity, drs equals one
when r ¼ s, and zero otherwise.
Let us denote the expenditure elasticity for the ith good
within the rth group of goods as EðrÞi. The group
expenditure elasticity for the rth group of goods as E(r),
and the total expenditure elasticity for the ith good within
the rth group of goods, Ei, is then deﬁned as
Ei ¼ EðrÞEðrÞi. (11)
In the same way, we can denote the within group price
elasticity between the ith and jth goods within the rth
group of goods as eðrÞij, the group price elasticity as eðrÞðsÞ
and the total price elasticities as eij. We can notice that the
within group price elasticity assumes that group expendi-
ture is unchanged in spite of the price change, whilst the
total price elasticity allows for the relevant changes in
group expenditure.
Finally, we can denote the equivalent total price
elasticity as
eij ¼ drseðrÞij þ EðrÞiwðsÞjðdrs þ eðrÞðsÞÞ. (12)
If we look at Eq. (12) for two goods within the same
group, we can see that the total price elasticity consists of
two components. The ﬁrst part is a direct effect, which
represents the subgroup elasticity, while the second part is
an indirect effect, which is a product of three factors. The
ﬁrst measure the relative change in the group price index
when the price of the jth good change (this is equal to
eðrÞj’the budget share’), the second factor measures the
effect a change in the price index has on the group
expenditure ð1 þ eðrÞðsÞÞ, while the third factor measures the
effect this change in within group expenditure has on the
consumption of the ith good ðEðrÞIÞ.
We can also notice that if the own between group price
elasticity eðrÞðrÞ ¼  1, then the group expenditure is
unaffected by the price change and eij ¼ eðrÞij. On the other
hand, if eðrÞðrÞ ¼ 0, then the price change produce a
proportional effect on the group expenditure.
The model speciﬁed above will be estimated using time
series data on Swedish consumption of non-durable goods
from 1980 to 2002. Energy tax data are then linked to each
type of good within the heating and transportation group.
Since the data spans over a relative long period we
conduct tests of structural stability of the demand system
for the entire sample period. The usual practice in assessing
the constancy of regression coefﬁcients over time it is to use
prior information concerning the true point of structural
change in the nature of regression relationship. The
researcher identiﬁes an event that is hypothesized to cause
structural change, estimates separate regression, and
examines whether the multiple sets of estimated coefﬁcients
are signiﬁcantly different from each other using an F-test.
This is the so-called Chow test. An alternative procedure is
to estimate the model over the full sample period with one
or more dummy variables. One drawback of Chow tests is
the maintained assumption that the sample variances are
equal in both time periods. An alternative, suggested by
Hansen (1992), is the Wald test that does not impose this
restriction.
It is important to note that both of these approaches
require prior information regarding the event that is
alleged to cause the structural change. One approach,
which does not require prior information concerning the
true point of structural change is to conduct a series of
Chow tests for each time period. An attractive property of
these 1-step Chow tests is that they allow the data to
identify when the true point of structural change occurs. A
related approach is that of Brown et al. (1975) (CU-
SUMSQ test). In this case, an analysis of the cumulative
sum of squared residuals from the regression determines, if
at all, structural (break) or shift occurs. These tests have
been employed on time series data to analyse the demand
for money (see Heller and Moshin, 1979), and aggregate
output ﬂuctuations (seeMcConnell and Perez-Quiros,
2000). In our context, we will use CUSUM (which is based
on the cumulative sum of recursive residuals) and
CUSUMSQ tests and the null hypothesis of these tests is
that the demand system coefﬁcients are constant over the
time period.
4. Description of the data
The data set employed consist of aggregate time series
over Swedish consumption of non-durable goods, and
energy taxes linked to each type of good within the heating
and transportation group covering the years 1980–2002.
Our demand system is composed of expenditure on the
following four main consumption groups: Foodstuff,
transports, heating, and other goods. Expenditures on
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5The model is estimated without any homogeneity, and symmetry
restrictions.
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follows:
1. Foodstuff: expenditure on food and beverages.
2. Transport: expenditure on petrol, car maintenance, and
public and other transport.
3. Heating: expenditure on electricity, district heating, and
oil.
4. Other goods: expenditure on clothes, health care,
recreation, domestic appliances and other.
The estimation of household demand for the main
groups (Eq. (6)) requires the following prices: general price
index (Pt), producer price index for each group ð¯ pðsÞtÞ, and
an energy tax index ðtðrÞðsÞÞ for heating and transportation.
The general price index is calculated using Eq. (2). The
energy tax index for heating is deﬁned as
lnðtheÞ¼wel lnðtelÞþwdis lnðtdisÞþwoil lnðtoilÞ,
where wel, wdis, and woil are weights representing the budget
share for electricity, district heating, and oil. The energy
tax index for transportation is deﬁned in a similar way,
where wpe, and wpub are the budget share for petrol and
public and other transport. Information on all the
necessary weights is available from our data. Finally, we
can use Eq. (3) to calculate the producer price index for the
heating and transportation groups since we have consumer
price indexes from our data and energy tax indexes as
described above.
Figs. 2–4 contain summary statistics for the consump-
tion data for the four main groups, and for the individual
types of energy goods.
As can be seen in Fig. 2 consumption of ‘‘transports’’
and ‘‘heating’’, measured as expenditure shares, have been
fairly stable over the period, although there is a weak
positive trend in the heating share. The ‘‘food’’ share,
however, has decreased strongly, whereas ‘‘other goods’’
has increased. Since income has increased over this time
period, the pattern in Fig. 2 indicates that ‘‘food’’ is a
necessary good, whereas ‘‘other goods’’ is a luxury.
6 In Fig.
3 we see that about 85% of total household expenditure on
heating during the sample period is used on electricity and
oil. Furthermore it can be seen that there has been a
substantial substitution from the use of oil towards
electricity during the same period.
5. Estimation and empirical results
Following the speciﬁcation in Eqs. (6) and (7), the
demand system for the main groups and for the goods
within the main groups is estimated by OLS. Tables B1–B5
in the Appendix, gives the estimates of the parameters of
the model. The results indicate that most of the estimated
parameters are signiﬁcantly different from zero, and that
the degree of explanation is good.
Based on the results from Tables B1–B5, we try to
address two issues before calculating the own-price and
expenditure elasticities. The ﬁrst is to test if the parameters
that represent the producer price and energy taxation
are equal or not. The result from this test is presented in
Table 1. According to the results, the null hypothesis of





















































Fig. 4. Expenditure shares, within transportation group.
6This conjecture is of course conditioned on unchanged relative prices.
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group and oil.
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The second issue is related to parameter stability in the
demand system. If the model is unstable it will be difﬁcult
to interpret the regression results. Since a parametric
econometric model is completely described by its para-
meters, model stability is equivalent to parameter stability
(see Chan and Lee, 1997). We rely on the CUSUM and
CUSUMSQ tests of Brown et al. (1975). The tests are
applied to the residuals of each main group in Eq. (6). The
CUSUM test is based on the cumulative sum of recursive
residuals. It is updated recursively and is plotted against
the time. If the plot of CUSUM statistic stays within 5%
signiﬁcance level (portrayed by two straight lines whose
equations are given in Brown et al., 1975), then coefﬁcient
estimates are said to be stable. A similar procedure is used
to carry out the CUSUMSQ, which is based on the squared
recursive residuals. In general, if the CUSUM or CU-
SUMSQ move outside the critical lines of 5% signiﬁcance
level, the null hypothesis will be rejected, meaning that the
model is unstable.
As can be seen from Appendix B, the plot of CUSUM
statistic stays within the critical lines indicating stability in
demand model. On the other hand, according to the
CUSUMSQ plot the line indicating the other goods group
moves outside of the 5% signiﬁcance level. However, since
this group contains a diverse composition of goods, it is not
wise to rely too heavily on this particular result and
therefore reject stability. Accordingly, there is evidence
supporting a stability hypothesis of the demand system.
Now we can use the estimated parameters to calculate
the elasticities. These elasticities depend on the values of
prices, energy taxes and total expenditure at which they are
evaluated. Here we evaluate the elasticities at the sample
mean for the period 1980–2002. Given the estimated
parameters, the expenditure and price elasticities can be
calculated according to (8)–(12). The resulting elasticities
are presented in Table 2.
From Table 2 we can notice that all expenditure and
own-price elasticities have the expected signs. The expen-
diture elasticities indicate that food, heating and transpor-
tation are necessities, whereas other goods are luxuries. All
own-price elasticities have a negative sign, meaning that a
price increase will reduce demand for that good.
Table 2 should be read in the following way. If the price
of electricity increases by 10%, the demand for electricity
decreases by 6.1%. But if the energy tax for electricity
increases by 10%, the demand for electricity is reduced by
18%. In other words, the energy tax for electricity has
larger impact on consumer demand than the producer price
of electricity.
From this point of view, we can notice that Swedish
consumers are more sensitive to energy taxes than producer
price for most energy goods except petrol and public and
other transport. It seems that a change in energy taxes for
these goods have a smaller impact than a change in
producer price for these goods. It should be noted that
most of the own price elasticities are between 0 and  1,
which implies that a higher price of one good increase its
budget share in spite of lower consumption of that good.
Also from Table 2, the total expenditure elasticities
indicate that all goods in the within food, heating and
transportation are necessities, i.e. these have total expendi-
ture elasticities less than one except for district heating.
Within the ‘‘other goods’’ group, clothes, recreation, and
domestic appliances are found to be luxuries, since they have
total expenditure elasticities that are larger than one. These
results are what we might expect, i.e. that appliances and
recreation are more of a luxury good than for example food.
Furthermore, the results in Table 2, show that the tax
elasticities seem to be—in absolute value—higher than  1
for electricity, oil, and district heating. For these goods,
higher energy taxes will lead to a relatively large reduction
in consumption, but also a decrease in the budget share.
From this point of view, we can say that the energy taxes
may be efﬁcient if the objective is to reduce emissions, but
inefﬁcient if the objective with the tax is strictly ﬁscal. On
the other hand, the tax elasticities for petrol and public and
other transport is less than  1, meaning that if the tax
increases on these goods, energy taxes will be more efﬁcient
from a ﬁscal point of view, at least in the short run.
6. Conclusion and discussion
One of the key issues in public policy in general, and
perhaps in environmental policy in particular, is how
consumers respond to changes in policy. In this paper the
issue is how consumers respond to changes in taxation, in
particular environmental taxation. The basic question
posed is if the response to a price change depends on the
source of the price change. The idea is to test if changes in
the consumer price that results from the introduction, or
change, in environmental taxes give a different signal to the
consumer, compared with changes in the consumer price
that results only from a producer price change.
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Table 1
F-test of parameter equality
Goods F-test The null hypothesis: gij ¼ ¯ gij
Heating 13.5* Reject
Transport 0.49 Do not reject
Petrol 7.4* Reject
Other transportation 52.5* Reject
Electricity 31.8* Reject
District heating 52.8* Reject
Oil 0.65 Do not reject
Note: * signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
7To calculate the F-test, we ﬁrst estimate the unrestricted model (Eq. (6)
for the main groups, or Eq. (7) for the goods within the main groups). In
the estimation of the restricted model we include an equality constraint on
the own-price parameter and the own-tax parameter, i.e. there is one
restriction in each equation.
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for Swedish households is estimated. To test for the
signalling effect of environmental taxes the consumer price
for energy goods is partitioned into a producer price part
and a tax part. The results of the study show that changes
in environmental taxes has a signiﬁcant signalling effect on
the demand for residential heating in the sense that the
consumers are more sensitive to a tax change than a
producer price change. For transports, however, the results
show no signiﬁcant difference. Concerning individual
commodities within the main groups the results shows
that the tax elasticity is higher (in absolute value) for all
types of energy within heating (electricity, oil, district
heating). Within transports, however, the results indicate
the opposite, i.e. petrol consumption seems to be less
sensitive to a tax change than to a change in the producer
price. These results are then indicating that environmental
policy, in the form of energy taxes, will be more effective in
reducing pollution due to consumption of heating, but less
effective in reducing pollution from transports.
In this paper we use macro level time-series data for
Swedish household expenditure. This may be one explana-
tion to the somewhat ambiguous results concerning the
signalling effect, i.e. we have not been able to control for
long-run trends in petrol consumption affected by for
example improvements in fuel efﬁciency. Furthermore, the
aggregate nature of the data may be another explanation.
It may be the case that there are large differences between
different types of households, depending on family size,
income level, place of residence, etc., which is not captured
using macro data. Thus, using panel data to determine the
difference in signalling effect at the speciﬁc level of
household may be a better way to investigate this matter.
Furthermore, one could also examine the effect of the
‘‘consistency’’ of environmental policy by estimating the
above model for the ﬁrst major introduction of the
environmental tax, compared with the subsequent increases
of the same tax. It may be the case that the signalling effect
is ‘‘non-linear’’ in the sense that the signalling effect is
stronger when the tax is introduced than for subsequent
changes of the tax. However, this will be subject for future
research.
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Table 2
Estimated own price and expenditure elasticities
Own-price Expenditure Total own-price Total expenditure
Main groups
Foodstuff  0.11 0.26
Heating  0.07 0.61
Heating tax  0.36*
Transport  0.17 0.53
Transport tax  0.20
Other goods  0.84 1.50
Foodstuff
Food  0.78 0.79  0.31 0.21
Beverages  0.98 1.43  0.57 0.38
Heating
Electricity  0.61 0.75  0.14 0.46
Electricity tax  1.80
*  1.40
District heating  0.43 1.92  0.08 1.18
District heating tax  1.83
*  1.59
Oil  0.99 1.04  0.86 0.64
Oil tax  1.58
*  1.49
Transports
Petrol  0.71 0.72  0.45 0.32
Petrol tax  0.46  0.21
Car maintenance  0.99 1.53  0.49 0.82
Public and other transport  0.55 0.49  0.47 0.26
Public and other transport tax  0.76  0.69
Other
Clothes  1.29 0.72  1.27 1.12
Other goods  0.81 1.03  0.73 1.60
Health care  0.23 0.64  0.23 0.90
Recreation  0.87 1.33  0.84 2.06
Domestic appl.  1.58 1.05  1.56 1.60
Note: *the signalling effect is signiﬁcant.
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Consider the share equation for Ideal Demand system
model using our previous notation:






~ gij ln ti þ bi lnðYt=PtÞ, (A.1)
where t denotes time. The price index, lnPt, is here deﬁned




wjt ln pjt; and pjt ¼ ¯ pjttjt.
A general deﬁnition of the price elasticities of demand





¼  dij þ
dlnwi
dln ¯ pj










where these elasticities refer to allocations within the group
holding constant total group expenditure (Y)a n da l lo t h e r
prices, dij is Kronecker delat (dij ¼ 1f o ri ¼ j; dij ¼ 0f o riaj).
In the linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand system
model, the common approach (e.g., Chalfant, 1987)i st o




Substituting (A.3) into (A.2) yields:







By the same way, we can drive the price elasticity for
energy tax.
In the LAIDS model, expenditure elasticities also ought
to account for the role of expenditure shares as variables in
Stone’s price index. The general expression for the









The usual approach treats shares as ﬁxed parameters in




Substituting (A.6) in (A.5) yields the expenditure elasticity
as following:





Demand system parameter Estimates for the period
1980–2002 for different group are Tables B1–B5.
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Table B2
Demand system parameter estimates for the period 1980 2002 in the food subgroup
Constant Price of food Price of beverages Expenditure coefﬁcient
Food 1.5 (10.4) 0.05 (4.6)  0.05 ( 5.1)  0.13 ( 5.2)
Beverages  0.54 ( 3.7)  0.5 ( 4.6) 0.05 (5.2)  0.13 ( 5.2)
Table B1
Demand system parameter estimates for the period 1980–2002 in the main group
Constant Price of
food








Food 1.6 (16.4) 0.17 (7.9)  0.004 ( 0.29)  0.01 ( 1.2) 0.007 (0.31) 0.006 (0.3)  0.18 ( 6.1)  0.18 ( 12.7)
Heating 0.23 (1.5)  0.03 ( 0.85) 0.07 (3.9) 0.05 (2.6)  0.03 ( 1.2) 0.002 (0.06) 0.02 (0.6)  0.03 ( 1.6)
Transport 0.5 (4.9) 0.01 (0.51)  0.03 ( 1.8)  0.2 ( 1.3) 0.01 (4.4) 0.09 (4.0)  0.07 ( 2.3)  0.06 ( 4.2)
Other goods  1.4 ( 9.1)  0.14 ( 4.2)  0.05 ( 2.5)  0.02 ( 0.92)  0.06 ( 1.8)  0.09 ( 2.5) 0.22 (4.9) 0.28 (12.1)
Table B3
Demand system parameter estimates for the period 1980–2002 in the heating subgroup
Constant Price of
Electricity





Price of oil Oil taxation Expenditure
coefﬁcient
Electricity 2.7 (7.5) 0.14 (2.4)  0.64 ( 4.5)  0.07 ( 1.5) 0.19 (2.2) 0.8 (1.7) 0.17 (1.3)  0.16 ( 3.1)
District
Heating
 2.5 ( 10.9)  0.11 ( 2.6) 0.2 (3.2) 0.14 (4.6)  0.13 ( 2.3) 0.08 (2.5) 0.38 (4.4) 0.18 (5.4)
Oil 1.1 (3.2)  0.16 ( 2.5)  0.03 ( 0.2)  0.14 ( 3.1)  0.12 ( 1.5) 0.002 (0.04)  0.07 ( 0.54) 0.006 (0.16)
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Fig. C1. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for food group. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Table B4
Demand system parameter estimates for the period 1980 2002 in the transport subgroup










Petrol 0.9 (3.9) 0.06 (1.4) 0.18 (2.3) 0.01 (0.29)  0.02 ( 0.40)  0.11 ( 2.2)  0.16 ( 3.9)
Car
maintenance
 0.69 ( 2.9)  0.11 ( 2.6)  0.18 ( 2.4) 0.08 (1.8)  0.02 ( 0.37) 0.004 (0.09) 0.21 (4.5)
Public and
other transport
0.88 (8.1) 0.04 (2.2) 0.0001 (0.004)  0.09 (3.7) 0.06 (2.7) 0.12 (5.2)  0.08 ( 4.1)
Table B5
Demand system parameter estimates for the period 1980–2002 in the Other goods subgroup











Clothes 1.1 (4.80)  0.05 ( 1.5)  0.18 ( 4.2)  0.03 ( 1.7) 0.17 (4.1)  0.01 ( 0.2)  0.04 ( 2.9)
Other goods  0.14 ( 0.68) 0.007 (0.2) 0.09 (2.4) 0.06 (2.9)  0.18 ( 4.4) 0.1 (1.4) 0.02 (1.07)
Health care 0.22 (2.7)  0.009 ( 0.64) 0.007 (0.5) 0.05 (7.1)  0.01 ( 0.79)  0.03 ( 1.4)  0.02 ( 4.8)
Recreation  0.59 ( 3.0) 0.02 (0.44) 0.06 (1.7)  0.04 ( 2.4) 0.03 (0.67) 0.02 (0.36) 0.05 (3.6)
Domestic
appliances
0.43 (3.1) 0.04 (1.9) 0.009 (0.37)  0.03 ( 2.5)  0.007 ( 0.31)  0.7 ( 1.6) 0.007 (0.75)
Note: t-values are presented in the parenthesis.



























Fig. C2. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for heating group. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Appendix C
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for different groups are given in Figs. C1–C4.
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Fig. C3. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for transport group. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% signiﬁcance level.
























Fig. C4. CUSUM and CUSUMSQ test for other goods. The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% signiﬁcance level.
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Abstract 
In this paper we estimate the income elasticity of demand for recreational services and 
other traditional groups of goods in Sweden and test for potential changes in such 
estimates over the twentieth century. Due to the difficulty of directly observing the 
demand for recreational services, we employ an indirect methodology by using the 
demand for some outdoor goods as a proxy for the demand for recreational services. In 
line with most prior research, our results confirm the expectation that recreational 
services, as a public good, is a luxury good in Sweden. Our results also show that the 
income elasticities for traditional goods are stable over time, indicating that consumer 
preferences for expenditure on these specific commodities do not change over time. 
Keywords: Household demand; environmental services; income elasticities; 
Engel curves. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the main goals in studying individual consumption behavior is to analyze the 
relationships between commodity expenditure and income or total expenditure (i.e. the 
well-known Engel curves). There are several reasons why these relationships are of 
interest. Firstly, it may be useful to see how demand for various goods develops under 
different growth scenarios. A second reason is to determine whether consumer 
preferences regarding various commodities have changed over time. 
The main objective of this paper is to compare how demand for recreational services 
and other major private goods in Sweden reacts to changes in income and, in particular, 
how these reactions have changed over time. Specifically, we investigate how the 
income elasticity in Sweden has changed over time with respect to some specific goods 
that are closely related (complementary) to environmental services.
1 Because 
consumption of recreational services is not directly observed in the market, the study 
uses the demand for complementary market products as a proxy for the demand for 
environmental services. Further, the objective of this paper is closely related to the 
notion of an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which describes a specific relation 
between environmental quality and growth. 
Several studies have examined the income elasticity for different commodities using 
data from different countries in different time frames. For example, Segal (2001) reports 
that the budget share for food has fallen dramatically in the United States over the 
twentieth century, from 50% for poor households and 30% for affluent households in 
1901 to 10-15% in 1999. Segal’s (2001) finding reaffirms Engel’s law of food from 
1895.
2 On the other hand, Segal (2001) found that the budget share for transportation 
increased from about 2% to more than 20%. Such results indicate a remarkable 
instability of the budget share for food and transportation expenditure in the U.S. over 
the century. 
                                                 
1   For convenience, we use the label “environmental services” for all goods and services provided by the 
environmental and the ecological system, including environmental quality, see for example, Mäler 
(1974). 
2   Formulated by German-born statistician, Ernst Engel (1821-1896), Engel's Law states that as incomes 
increase, the proportion of income spent on food falls. 
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Larsen (2001) used Norwegian survey data on purchasing behavior for equipment and 
lodging over the period 1986-1995. He found that the income elasticity was fairly stable 
over time, and that both equipment and lodging were luxury goods over the whole 
period. Further, Miles et al. (2002) used several models, both parametric and non-
parametric, to estimate Engel curves using survey data from Uruguay. They found that 
the results differ substantially depending on model specification and estimation method. 
However, their results support the hypothesis that the environment is a luxury good in 
Uruguay. Kriström and Riera (1996) using estimates of the willingness to pay for 
environmental goods for different European countries (Finland, France, Norway, 
Holland, Spain and Sweden), found that the hypothesis that environmental goods are 
necessary goods cannot be rejected in most cases (income elasticity is less than one). 
The estimation of income elasticities over several years has strict requirements for data. 
The data sets must be comparable, span a substantial period, be of high quality, 
exhaustively cover expenditure opportunities, and preferably be random samples. The 
Swedish Family Expenditure Survey (FES) have some attractive features for the 
question at hand: respondents are randomly selected, data contain information of actual 
market behavior where budget constraints are observed and obeyed, the classifications 
of goods are retained over time and the choice set is saturated and exhausts purchase 
possibilities. Time trends are detectable since data span a considerable time period and 
are comparable over time. This paper uses FES data for 1913, 1984, 1988, and 1996. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next two sections, we elaborate 
further on the existing literature, as well as on the theoretical framework for our 
empirical investigation. Our econometric model is presented in section 4. Section 5 
describes the data used in the study. The results from the model are presented in section 
6. Finally, a short summary and some concluding remarks are given in section 7. 
2. Previous Studies   
Much discussion exists in the economic literature of the possible effects of income and 
economic growth on the environment, including speculation on the possible existence of 
an “environmental Kuznets curve”. This curve shows an inverted U-shaped relation 
between pollution and per capita income, indicating that in the early stages of a 
country’s economic development pollution increases up to a turning point and then 
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begins to decrease as per capita income increases further. The EKC idea has triggered a 
good deal of research, theoretical as well as empirical. The theoretical literature has 
focused mostly on assumptions regarding the relationship between 
technology/preferences and emissions (Lopez, 1994, Selden and Song, 1995, McConell, 
1997, Chichilnisky 1998, de Groot 1999). In general, empirical models are of a reduced 
form type using cross country data (Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Stern and Common, 
2001). An obvious drawback with most of the empirical models is that they can only 
describe the relation, not explain it. To understand the mechanisms at work, we need 
further knowledge about technological progress and how consumer preferences are 
formed. 
Clearly related to this issue is the question of how consumer demand for recreational 
services and environmental goods reacts to income changes. If the income elasticity is 
greater than one, this would be consistent with the EKC hypothesis. However, income 
elasticity is also important from a distributional perspective, since it will tell us which 
groups in society will reap the benefits of projects that improve environmental services. 
Therefore, such estimates of demand and income elasticity of recreational services and 
environmental goods may provide significant information to any cost-benefit analysis or 
ex-post project evaluation; see Kanninen and Kriström (1992), Kriström and Riera 
(1996), and Hökby and Söderqvist (2001). 
The basic problem in the estimation of income elasticity for environmental goods is that 
we cannot directly observe individual demand for recreational services due to its public 
good and/or non-market priced nature. Therefore, we cannot directly estimate the 
income elasticity for such goods. To overcome this problem, two different approaches 
are suggested in the literature. The first approach is to use “stated preference” data,
3 and 
the second is to employ an indirect estimation technique derived from the fact that 
households have to purchase complementary goods.  
The first approach is a direct approach based on contingent valuation surveys (Kriström 
and Riera, 1996, Hökby and Söderqvist, 2001). Under this approach, willingness to pay 
data is regressed on income and other individual characteristics. In Kriström and Riera 
                                                 
3   This approach mainly relies on individuals’ hypothetical behavior on markets set up for environmental 
service in some survey setting. The contingent valuation method (CVM) is widely used in this 
approach (Mitchell and Carson, 1989 and Batemen and Willis, 1999). 
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(1996) willingness to pay data for various environmental goods in a number of 
European countries are regressed on income. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, 
Kriström and Riera found that willingness to pay for environmental improvements 
decreases with income, which indicates that the income elasticity is lower than one. 
Using the same methodology, Hökby and Söderqvist (2001) found similar results. A 
problem with this approach is that the magnitude of the willingness to pay elasticity 
with respect to income may not give complete information concerning the demand 
elasticity with respect to income.
4 To address this problem, Hökby and Söderqvist also 
merge data from several willingness to pay studies for the same environmental good, 
reduced marine eutrophication in the Baltic Sea, and again found that the income 
elasticity for reduced eutrophication is less than one. 
The second approach is an indirect estimation approach based on the fact that 
individuals, in order to generate utility from the environment, need private goods that 
are bought and sold in the market and, therefore, can be observed. For example, to enjoy 
the excitement of a salmon river it is necessary to have some fishing gear, or at least 
some outdoor gear. Thus, if demand for fishing gear and other goods that are closely 
related to the “consumption” of environmental amenities increase more than 
proportionally with the increase in income, the interpretation may be that the 
environment is a luxury good (Mäler, 1974).  
There are a number of previous studies that have used the indirect approach, such as 
Costa (1997), Pereyra and Rossi (1998), Miles et al. (2002), and Larsen (2001). Costa 
(1997), using U.S. data, reported elasticities greater than one for recreation goods. 
However, she found that these elasticities decreased significantly over the last hundred 
years. Pereyra and Rossi (1998) applied a parametric method using data from Uruguay 
and found corroborative evidence that environmental goods constitute a luxury good. 
Miles et al. (2002) used parametric estimates to confirm the hypothesis that the outdoor 
recreational services constitute a luxury good in Uruguay. Larsen (2001) used 
Norwegian survey data on purchasing behavior for equipment and lodging over the 
period 1986-1995 to estimate Engel curves. He found that the income elasticity was 
                                                 
4  The income elasticity of willingness to pay and the ordinary income elasticity of demand are related. 
However, knowledge of one is insufficient to determine the magnitude or even the sign of the other. 
The income elasticity of willingness to pay is influenced by additional factors that are generally 
unobservable. For more details, see Flores and Carson (1997). 
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fairly stable over time, and that both equipment and lodging were luxury goods over the 
whole period. 
In this study, we follow the second approach, using household survey data for Sweden. 
Using this data, we estimate Engel curves for private goods that are used in the 
production of environmental services. As well as estimating the income elasticity for 
proxy goods used for recreational services (outdoor recreation), we also estimate the 
income elasticity of demand for other traditional market goods in Sweden over the same 
period in order to compare relative changes in consumer preferences. 
To achieve our objectives, we formulate and estimate an econometric model for purely 
private goods and for private goods that are complementary to public goods. The model 
employed is based on the assumption of a two-stage budgeting process. It is assumed 
that in the first stage, the household allocates its total expenditure for purely private 
goods and goods complementary to recreation on different commodity aggregates, or 
groups. There are five groups: one group of goods complementary to outdoor 
recreation, and four purely private groups: food, transportation, energy goods, and other 
goods. Given the allocation to each commodity group, households in the second stage 
allocate their group expenditures on the various goods within the group. Our 
econometric model is based on Deaton & Muellbauer’s (1980) almost ideal model 
(AIDS). The inclusion of data from a budget survey for 1913 enables us to compare the 
results over a longer time span. 
3. Theory 
The theory behind our approach can be outlined as follows. Assume that individuals 
have preferences over a vector of private goods x  = [x1,…,  xK] and a vector of 
environmental commodities (experiences), e = [e1,…, eP], that can be translated into a 
utility function that is weakly separable in x and e: 
U(x, e) = U(x, u
e(e)) (1) 
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Following Freeman (2003), we assume that environmental commodities, e, are 
produced using environmental attributes,
5 A =) , and market goods, z = 
 according to: 
,..., ( 1 k A A
), ,..., ( 1 m z z
) , ( A z e er =                (2)  l r ,..., 1 =
The production function (2) has the properties that e is increasing in A and z, and that 
all inputs are essential in the production of e. In other words, both environmental 
attributes and market goods contribute to production of outdoor recreational 
experiences. By substituting (2) into (1), we obtain the following optimization problem: 
{ } , . . )) , ( ( , ( max
, y t s u U z x
e ≤ + z p x p A z e x
z x  (3) 
where px and pz are the price vectors corresponding to x and z respectively, and y is the 
expenditure on private and complementary goods. 
The first order conditions to this problem implicitly define the demand functions for the 
“instrumental” goods, z, as a function of prices, income, attributes, preferences, and 
production technology, i.e.: 
,...,m i ,y) , , p z( z z x i 1 = = A p  (4) 
where  x p  is the price index for private goods, and y is expenditure on goods that are 
complementary to environmental goods.
6
According to equation (4), changes over time in expenditure on zi may result from 
changes in prices, income, or environmental attributes. However, we do not attempt to 
account here for changes in environmental attributes, and therefore consider them to be 
constant over time. Thus equation (4) constitutes the basis for our analysis, and will 
serve as a starting point in the specification of the econometric model in the following 
section. 
 
                                                 
5   Freeman gives examples of environmental attributes, such as number of fish per volume of water and 
water quality. Here, we may add air quality, sounds, wild-life, ski tracks and number of sunny days. 
6   The reason for using  x p  instead of a vector of private good prices is the assumption of weak 
separability between private and public goods.      
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4. The Modeling Framework  
In this section we formulate a demand system for public and private goods. In the first 
stage, the household determines, given its total budget, how much to spend on food, 
energy goods, transportation, and other goods as private groups, and outdoor recreation 
services as a public group. In the second stage, the household allocates resources within 
each of these groups. For example, given a specific amount of money to be spent on 
transportation, the household determines how much of that should be allocated to 
gasoline, car maintenance, and public transport. In the same manner, the household 
determines in the second stage how to use its budget for outdoor recreation. In this case, 
the household can choose between “equipment for sporting, fishing and camping”, and 
“other recreational goods”. Our main objective is to model and estimate household 
choices in the first and second stage. 
The Linear Almost Ideal Demand system (LAIDS) is one of the most popular demand 
models for estimation of Engel curves. In the empirical estimation of Engel curves, non-
linearity has been found to be important for some goods. For instance, Banks et al. 
(1997) found that the Engel curves for some specific goods in the UK are non-linear in 
the logarithm of expenditure. To overcome the problem of non-linearity, Banks et al. 
(1997) developed the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand system (QUAIDS).  
In this paper we take the quadratic AIDS (QUAIDS) model as our basic specification. 
Given the structure of two-stage budgeting, we can express demand for the 
complementary goods, z, and pure private aggregates, x, in budget share form for 
household h as:
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Equation (5) describes the budget share for the public commodity group for household h 
= 1, ..., H, where   denotes the budget share for group z in period t,  t z) ( w t z) ( p  and  t x) ( p
                                                
 
are group price indices for public and private goods, respectively Rt is total expenditure 
 
7   In the estimation, we have three main private groups (foodstuff, energy goods, and transportation). 
Thus x in equation (6) can be viewed as a vector of private goods, and the group price index for 
private goods as a vector of group price indices.  
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on public and private goods,  t P  is the overall consumer price index, and t z) ( ε  is the error 
term. In the same manner, equation (6) gives the budget share for private commodities, 
where  denotes the budget share for private goods x in period t,  t x) ( w t x) ( p  is a group 
price index for private goods and  t x) ( ε  is the error term. The parameters to be estimated 
are α, γ, β, andλ . 
The demand functions for household h in goods within the sub-groups have the same 
functional form as the demand equations for the main groups. The demand function for 
goods within the z
th, and the x
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where i = 1,..., m denotes the number of goods within z and h = 1, ..., H denotes 
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where i = 1,..., n denotes the number of goods within x. 
Equations (7) and (8) give the allocation within the public and private groups, where 
 and   are the budget shares for the individual goods within each group,   
and   are the commodity prices within respective group, R
() it z w it x w ) ( () j z p
j x p ) ( (z)t is the total expenditure 
on goods complementary to public goods, and R(x)t is the total expenditure on the pure 
private goods. 
In any time period t, we assume that the prices of goods are equal across all households. 
This means that since we will estimate the model for each cross-section separately, the 
prices can be included directly into the intercept term for any time period. Thus, for 
each cross-section we can write the budget shares to be estimated as:
 8
                                                 
8   This means that we can exclude the price in the estimation of each cross-section. 
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where t = 1,..., T is the number of cross-sections, and where  ,  ,  , and   
now include the (constant) price. 
h
t z) ( α
h
t x) ( α
h
it z) ( α
h
it x) ( α
According to this system, equations (9) and (10) describe how household   allocate its 
total expenditure between public and private groups respectively, while equation (11) 
and (12) describe the allocation of household expenditure to goods within the public and 
private groups.  
h
5. Data and Econometric Consideration 
This study uses cross-sectional data from four Swedish Family Expenditure Surveys 
(FES) 1913, 1984, 1988, and 1996. The first household expenditure survey in Sweden 
was performed in 1913, covering approximately 900 households in eight towns. The 
1984 survey included 4354 households, the 1988 survey 3764 households, and the 1996 
survey 1104 households. The surveys contain expenditure data on a rather 
disaggregated level. Here, however, we will focus on four main aggregates:
9
Outdoor recreation: Expenditure on “sporting, fishing, and camping equipment”, and 
“other recreation goods”.   
Transport:  Expenditure on “petrol”, “car maintenance”, and “public and other 
transport”. 
Energy goods: Expenditure on “electricity”, and “other energy goods”. 
Foodstuffs: Expenditure on “food” and “beverages”. 
                                                 
9   The 1913 survey uses only an aggregate general title for recreational goods, which includes outdoor 
and indoor recreation and gives no data within the groups except for foodstuffs. 
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Table 1 presents the budget shares for the four main groups and their sub-groups. As 
shown, household expenditure for outdoor recreation, transportation, and energy goods 
have been fairly stable over time, although there is a weak negative trend in the energy 
goods share. However, the share of foodstuffs has decreased significantly, while 
approximately 45% of household expenditure went to foodstuff in 1913, this share 
declined to less than 30% in 1984, and to less than 20% in 1996. 
Table 1 also shows that there was no dramatic change in household expenditure for 
most of the goods within the main groups, except for spending on sporting, fishing and 
camping equipment, which decreased substantially. Approximately 60% of household 
expenditure on recreation went to equipment in 1984, but by 1996 this share had 
decreased to 35%. 
Household characteristics may affect consumer behavior with respect to these four 
groups of goods. There are basically two different ways to consider different household 
characteristics in the model estimation (Pollak and Wales, 1992). The first technique is 
to consider the sample as a whole and use different dummy variables to capture 
different household characteristics. The second is to divide the sample into homogenous 
sub-samples depending on household characteristics. In this paper, we follow the first 
approach. The variables relating to household characteristics were: (a) a continuous 
variable that represents the number of adults, and (b) three dummy variables for the 
cases when the household has one child, two children, or more than two children less 
than 18 years of age.
10 We also create regional dummy variables (seven for the eight 
census regions in the 1913 survey, and five for the six census regions in the 1984, 1988, 
and 1996 surveys). In the estimation, we use total expenditure rather than income 
because expenditure better reflects permanent income. 
                                                 
10   We also estimated the model by using dummy variables for the number of adults, but this did not 
change the results.  
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Foodstuff  0.47    (0.07)  0.30     (0.09)  0.27    (0.09)  0.18    (0.07) 
Energy goods  0.05    (0.01)  0.14    (0.11)  0.14    (0.10)  0.13    (0.12) 
Transport  0.02    (0.01)  0.08    (0.06)  0.07    (0.06)  0.08    (0.07) 
Outdoor recreation  0.01   (0.009) 0.005  (0.01)  0.005  (0.02)  0.008   (0.02) 
Sum  0.55    0.525   0.485   0.498  
FOODSTUFFS 
Food  0.97    (0.03)  0.90    (0.09)  0.89    (0.10)  0.86    (0.10) 
Beverages  0.03    (0.03)  0.10    (0.09)  0.11    (0.10)  0.14     (0.10) 
Sum 1.00    1.00   1.00   1.00  
ENERGY GOODS 
Electricity    0.39      (0.40) 0.37      (0.32) 0.34     (0.21) 
Other energy goods    0.61      (0.40) 0.63      (0.31) 0.66     (0.28) 
Sum    1.00 1.00 1.00 
TRANSPORT 
Petrol    0.51     (0.33)  0.51     (0.12)  0.60     (0.33) 
Car maintenance    0.40     (0.31)  0.41     (0.33)  0.28     (0.31) 
Public and other transport    0.09     (0.12)  0.08     (0.19)  0.12     (0.21) 
    1.00   1.00   1.00  
OUTDOOR RECREATION 
Equipment for sporting, 
fishing, and camping 
  0.61     (0.45)  0.52     (0.42)  0.37     (0.44) 
Other recreational goods    0.39     (0.42)  0.48     (0.44)  0.63     (0.46) 
Sum   1.00  100  1.00 
Number of observation  908 
 
4354 3764 1104 
Note: Standard errors within parentheses. 
In this study, we estimate the quadratic almost ideal demand system in expenditure 
form. To capture the effect of household size and composition on the consumer 
preferences, we follow Blundell et al. (1993) in allowing the parameters in the model 
(  and ) to vary over time and over different types of household characteristics 
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Dhkt represents dummy variables for demographic characteristics, including number of 
children and a dummy variable for different regions. The number of dummy variables, 
q, is equal to 11 in the 1913 survey, and 9 in the1984, 1986, and 1996 surveys.  






















+ + =  (22) 
Where   denotes household h’s income elasticity for good i. A good with an income 
elasticity larger than one is a luxury, while a good with an income elasticity lower than 
one is a necessity. However, equation (16) implies that each good can be either a 
necessity or a luxury for different households, depending upon the distribution of total 
expenditure and the household specific parameters. 
h
i ξ
Finally, the most challenging problem is how to deal with observed zero expenditure, 
since the parameter estimation tends to be biased in a regression model where a large 
                                                 
11   The income elasticity for a specific good denotes the percentage change in the consumption of the 
good as a result of the percentage change in total consumption. See Chalfant (1987) for a derivation of 
income elasticitiy in an AIDS model. 
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proportion of the dependent variable is zero (Deaton 1986, Greene 2000).
12 There are at 
least two possible reasons for an observation of zero. One is that the household is not 
interested in the good. Another is that even if a household does have a preference for a 
good, expenditures may be infrequent and lie outside the observation period. To be sure 
that our data is consistent with the estimation results, we estimate the demand equation 
by an alternative estimator (Tobit estimator) which assumes that any observation for 
which the dependent variable takes a zero value is truncated.
13 However, this does not 
change the results concerning income elasticity to any great extent.
14
6. Results 
This section presents the results of applying the parametric approach to estimate the 
income elasticity for outdoor recreation, energy goods, transportation, and foodstuffs for 
Swedish households in four different years during the twentieth century. We start the 
analysis by testing the functional form for the expenditure equations in order to decide 
whether the non-linear expenditure term should be included in the model or not. Table 2 
shows the results of this test. 
According to the F-tests in table 2, we cannot reject linearity for any of the main groups 
in any of the surveys except for the energy goods group in 1984 and 1988. Among the 
sub-groups, linearity cannot be rejected for any of the goods within the foodstuffs group 
in all surveys, for public and other transport in the 1984, 1988, and 1996 surveys, or for 






                                                 
12   The proportion of zero expenditure on outdoor recreation in our surveys is approximately 35%.        
13   The standard Tobit model was originally formulated by Tobin (1958). 
14   The results from the Tobit estimator was compared with OLS estimator which we used in this 
estimation. 
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Foodstuff 0.64  1.01
  0.91 0.50 
Energy goods   0.86  2.45*  5.82*  0.89 
Transport 0.24    0.73   1.79 0.29 
Outdoor  recreation  0.41 0.21 0.12 0.15 
FOODSTUFFS  
Food  1.85 0.70 0.51 1.43 
Beverages  1.85 0.69 0.51 1.43 
ENERGY GOODS 
Electricity  8.19*  12.55*  1.93 
Other energy goods    8.19*  12.56*  1.93 
TRANSPORT 
Petrol    31.54* 22.36* 13.60* 
Car  maintenance    31.89* 23.22* 11.80* 
Public and other transport    0.46  0.74  1.86 
OUTDOOR RECREATION 
Equipment for sporting, 
fishing, and camping 
 3.68*  2.43*  1.71 
Other recreational goods    3.68*  2.43*  1.72 
* Linearity rejected at the 5% level. 
Following the specifications in equations (9), (10), (11), and (12), the demand equations 
for the goods in the main groups and within the main groups are estimated by ordinary 
least squares (OLS) and the functional form is determined according to the linearity 
tests above.
15 For example, in the main group, the linear form should be used in the 
estimation of every group except energy goods for the 1913 and 1988 surveys. 
Table 3 presents estimates with standard errors of the income elasticities of the various 
goods. These elasticities are computed from the coefficient estimates, the estimated 
budget shares, and the mean total expenditures for all households in every survey, 
following equation (22). Standard errors are computed with the delta method (see 
Greene, 2000). 
                                                 
15   Estimates with standard errors of the parameters of the demand equations are available from the 
author upon request. 
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Table 3. Estimated income elasticities, standard errors within parentheses. 
























Note: total income elasticity for any good within the main group of goods is calculated by multiplying the 
income elasticity for the main group by the income elasticity within the main group.  
Elasticities can be examined in two different ways, focusing either on the differences 
between different goods, or on differences over time. 
Considering differences over time, we can conclude that outdoor recreation seems to be 
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(0.03) 
Energy goods  0.55 
(0.04) 
 0.31   0.22    0.26 
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 0.62  1.15   0.79 1.53   0.90 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
 
1.84 
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consistent with previous research such as that of Costa (1997), Pereyra and Rossi 
(1998), Miles et al. (2002), and Larsen (2001). However, it contradicts to some extent 
the finding of Kriström and Riera (1996), who showed some empirical evidence that 
environmental amenities are not luxury. 
Our results support the classification of environmental goods as luxury goods, as 
income elasticities are estimated above one for all the time periods. This, in 
combination with the fact that income in Sweden has increased over the last 100 years, 
implies that demand for environmental goods has been non-decreasing for that time 
period. Thus, if we have an increase in future income, we may expect a more than 
proportional increase in demand for recreation goods. This is consistent with the 
assumed shape of the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). 
Table 3 also shows that the income elasticity for the main groups seems to remain 
constant over time. The income elasticity fluctuates around two for outdoor recreation 
and around one for transportation. On the other hand, the income elasticities for food 
and energy goods decreased slightly between 1913 and 1996.
16 This implies that we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the budget for these goods is stable over time, 
indicating that consumer preferences for expenditures on these specific commodities 
have not changed significantly over time.
17
Concerning the differences between different goods, the results in Table 3 show that the 
income elasticities for transportation fluctuate around one over the various cross-
sections. For energy goods and foodstuffs, the elasticity is smaller than one, indicating 
that these goods are considered as necessities. 
From Table 3, we also notice that the total income elasticities within the main groups 
indicate that equipment for sporting, swimming, and camping, car maintenance and 
other recreational goods are luxuries, (i.e. they have income elasticities higher than 
one), while food, petrol, public and other transport, electricity, and other energy goods 
are necessities, since they have income elasticities that are less than one. Two tailed t- 
tests show that the income elasticities for all goods are significantly different from one 
                                                 
16   Remember that the expenditure elasticities are estimated for independent cross-sections, where 
households face the same prices. Between cross-sections, there will be price changes and quality 
changes, however this is not considered here. 
17   Since the difference in the income elasticities for these goods is quite small, we cannot reject stability. 
16 Demand for Environmental Quality 
except for the transport group in the 1984 and 1988 surveys and beverages in the 1913 
survey (the results from this test are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A). 
Income elasticities evaluated at the mean for different categories of household are 
presented in Tables A2-A5 in Appendix A. From these results, we see that there are no 
large differences in income elasticities between households in different regions or of 
different family size, indicating that household location and family size do not have a 
big impact on consumer preferences for expenditure on these specific commodities. 
In summary, we find that outdoor recreation is a luxury good and that its luxury status 
seems to be robust over time. Foodstuffs and energy goods, however, serve as 
necessities. We may also conclude that the demand for transportation has increased 
more than the demand for foodstuffs and energy goods, but less than the demand for 
outdoor recreation. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we estimated the income elasticity of demand for recreational services and 
other traditional groups of goods in Sweden, and tested for potential changes in such 
estimates over the twentieth century. The data were drawn from Swedish household 
surveys for the years 1913, 1984, 1988, and 1996. Because of the difficulty of directly 
observing the demand for recreational services, we employed an indirect methodology 
by using the demand for some outdoor goods as a proxy for the recreational services 
demand. In line with most prior research, our results confirm the expectation that 
recreational services, as a public good, is a luxury good in Sweden. 
In relation to the shape of an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), our results support 
the suggested shape of the EKC, at least to some extent. We found that outdoor 
recreational service is a luxury good and that demand was non-decreasing during the 
whole period. Our contribution supplements that of other studies of the phenomenon 
(Grossman and Krueger, 1995, Hilton and Levinson, 1998, Selden and Song, 1995). 
The results also show that recreational services have maintained this luxury good 
attribute in Sweden over the twentieth century, indicating no significant change in 
consumer preferences over time. The income elasticity for transportation goods 
fluctuated around one during the period of interest, while both energy goods and food 
17 Demand for Environmental Quality 
maintained their attributes as necessities during this period, with a steady decline in 
their income elasticities over time.  
According to our results, expenditure on environmental services increases with income. 
This is true when all other factors remain constant. However, when changes occur in 
preferences, prices, environmental attributes, and the production structure for outdoor 
recreational experiences, it becomes difficult to predict the demand for environmental 
services in the future. This is a question of interest for future research. Quality changes 
are well-known causes of data misinterpretations, e.g., the difficulties in disentangling 
the relation between changes in quality and price. Further, the demand function is also a 
function of relative prices. If outdoor recreation becomes cheaper to produce, then, all 
other things being equal, we would expect more households to consume it. If prices, 
preferences, and mean income change at the same time, interpretation becomes difficult. 
As it is, this study relegates price effects to a constant term.  
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Appendix A 
 











  -52.00* -14.66*  Foodstuff 
Energy goods  -11.25*  -17.25*  39.00*  -16.75* 
Transport 2.44*  -0.33   -1.00 4.50* 
Outdoor  recreation  9.75* 5.80* 5.87* 3.88* 
FOODSTUFFS 
Food -10.00*  -20.00*  -9.00*  -8.00* 
Beverages 0.66  22.66*  17.75*  8.80* 
ENERGY GOODS 
Electricity    -15.00* -42.50* -10.40* 
Other energy goods    -1.88*  5.00  10.00* 
TRANSPORT 
Petrol   -5.00*  -27.00*  -15.00* 
Car  maintenance    5.33* 9.50* 5.12* 
Public and other transp.    -3.50*  -0.75*  -10.14* 
OUTDOOR RECREATION 
Equipment for sporting, 
fishing, and camping 
  23.00* 5.00* 26.00* 
Other recreation goods    -12.66*  -4.20*  -5.00* 
Note: * denotes significance at the 5% percent level. A negative t-value indicates that the 
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Number of children 
C1  0.64 (0.01)  0.55  (0.03)  1.12 (0.08)  1.69  (0.09) 
C2  0.66 (0.01)  0.55  (0.03)  1.07 (0.08)  1.65  (0.09) 
C3  0.61 (0.01)  0.55  (0.03)  1.17 (0.08)  1.83  (0.09) 
Region 
R1  0.66 (0.01)  0.55  (0.03)  1.07 (0.08)  1.64  (0.09) 
R2  0.67 (0.01)  0.54  (0.03)  1.06 (0.08)  1.64  (0.09) 
R3  0.66 (0.01)  0.56  (0.03)  1.06 (0.08)  1.57  (0.09) 
R4  0.66 (0.01)  0.56  (0.03)  1.07 (0.08)  1.62  (0.08) 
R5  0.66 (0.01)  0.56  (0.03)  1.07 (0.08)  1.64  (0.09) 
R6  0.67 (0.01)  0.56  (0.03)  1.04 (0.08)  1.63  (0.09) 
R7  0.67 (0.01)  0.55  (0.03)  1.06 (0.12)  1.66  (0.09) 
Notes: C1= 1 child below 18, C2= 2 children below 18, C3= more than 2 children below 18, 
 R1=Uppsala, R2= Eskilstuna, R3= Jönköping, R4=Malmö, R5= Hälsingborg, R6= Gothenburg, 
R7=Västerås. Standard errors within parentheses. 
 
 















Number of children 
C1  0.64 (0.01)  0.32  (0.03)  0.92 (0.03)  1.89  (0.13) 
C2  0.61 (0.01)  0.35  (0.03)  0.93 (0.03)  1.85  (0.14) 
C3  0.61 (0.01)  0.33  (0.03)  0.94 (0.03)  1.87  (0.13) 
Region 
R1  0.65 (0.01)  0.35  (0.03)  0.92 (0.03)  1.89  (0.13) 
R2  0.65 (0.01)  0.35  (0.03)  0.92 (0.03)  1.88  (0.13) 
R3  0.65 (0.01)  0.36  (0.03)  0.92 (0.03)  1.90  (0.13) 
R4  0.65 (0.01)  0.34  (0.03)  0.92 (0.03)  1.89  (0.13) 
R5  0.65 (0.01)  0.36  (0.03)  0.93 (0.03)  1.90  (0.13) 
R6  0.65 (0.01)  0.35  (0.03)  0.93 (0.03)  1.90  (0.13) 
Notes: C1= 1 child below 18, C2= 2 children below 18, C3= more than 2 children below 18, 
R1 = Stockholm, R2= Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns 
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Number of children 
C1  0.62 (0.01)  0.16  (0.03)  0.91 (0.03)  1.86  (0.13) 
C2  0.61 (0.01)  0.13  (0.03)  0.90 (0.03)  1.86  (0.14) 
C3  0.58 (0.01)  0.16  (0.03)  0.91 (0.03)  1.85  (0.14) 
Region 
R1  0.60 (0.01)  0.19  (0.03)  0.89 (0.03)  1.83  (0.13) 
R2  0.59 (0.01)  0.19  (0.03)  0.89 (0.03)  1.83  (0.13) 
R3  0.61 (0.01)  0.18  (0.03)  0.89 (0.03)  1.83  (0.13) 
R4  0.59 (0.01)  0.18  (0.03)  0.89 (0.02)  1.83  (0.13) 
R5  0.61 (0.01)  0.19  (0.03)  0.90 (0.03)  1.84  (0.13) 
R6  0.60 (0.01)  0.18  (0.03)  0.90 (0.03)  1.83  (0.13) 
Notes: C1= 1 child below 18, C2= 2 children below 18, C3= more than 2 children below 18, 
R1 = Stockholm, R2= Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns 
northern areas, R6= northern areas. Standard errors within parentheses. 
  















Number of children 
C1  0.74 (0.03)  0.32  (0.03)  1.11 (0.06)  1.93  (0.24) 
C2  0.72 (0.03)  0.32  (0.04)  1.13 (0.06)  1.98  (0.25) 
C3  0.67 (0.03)  0.33  (0.04)  1.13 (0.06)  1.97  (0.26) 
Region 
R1  0.70 (0.03)  0.33  (0.04)  1.10 (0.06)  1.93  (0.24) 
R2  0.67 (0.02)  0.33  (0.04)  1.11 (0.06)  1.94  (0.24) 
R3  0.67 (0.04)  0.32  (0.03)  1.11 (0.06)  1.94  (0.24) 
R4  0.70 (0.04)  0.32  (0.03)  1.11 (0.06)  1.92  (024) 
R5  0.72 (0.03)  0.32  (0.03)  1.10 (0.06)  1.93  (0.24) 
R6  0.71 (0.03)  0.32  (0.03)  1.11 (0.06)  1.95  (0.24) 
Notes: C1= 1 child below 18, C2= 2 children below 18, C3= more than 2 children below 18, 
R1 = Stockholm, R2= Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns 
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of income distribution for the aggregate relation between pollution and income. The main 
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and the emission functions, it is not possible to determine a priori the slope or the curvature 
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for an average household. Further, the results show that the curvature of the relation differs 
between different types of households. We also show that altering the prevailing income 
distribution, holding average income constant, will affect aggregate emissions in the sense 
that an equalization of incomes will give rise to an increase in emissions. One implication is 
then that the development of aggregate pollution due to growth depends not only on the 
income level, but also on how growth is distributed. 
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 The Income-Pollution Relationship …. 
1. Introduction 
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between pollution and income 
at household level. The analysis is motivated by the recent literature emphasizing the 
importance of income distribution for the aggregate relation between pollution and income 
(see for example Stern, 1998, Torras & Boyce, 1998, Heerink et al. 2001, and Huang, 2005). 
For example, Heerink et al. (2001) showed that if the relationship between pollution and 
income is non-linear at the individual level, the aggregate pollution-income relationship will 
depend on income distribution. Thus, if the individual relationship is non-linear, omitting 
income distribution from the aggregate analysis will produce biased results. However, no 
studies to date have used a structural approach to investigate the way in which individual (or 
household) pollution changes with economic growth. The empirical analyses available are 
mostly reduced form aggregate types of studies that are unable to encompass tests of how 
income changes affect individual pollution via changes in the real consumption basket. Here 
we will address the issue on the household level by estimating a demand model for Swedish 
households which is directly linked to emissions of sulfur, nitrogen oxides, and carbon 
dioxide. We will then use the result to illustrate how changes in income distribution affect 
aggregate emissions of CO2, SO2 and NOx in Sweden.  
The relationship between environmental performance and economic development has been 
the subject of discussion for a long time. One line of argument is that economic growth 
inevitably leads to more emissions and ultimately to degradation of the natural environment 
(Meadows et al. 1972, 1992). Another is that economic growth is necessary for improving the 
environment. This latter argument can be found in, for example, Grossman and Krueger 
(1991, 1995), who showed that for some emissions there appears to be an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between emissions and income. Countries with relatively low income appear to 
have relatively low emissions, middle income countries have relatively high emissions, and 
high income countries tend to have relatively low emissions. Thus the conclusion would be 
that as a poor country gets richer, emissions rise. However, when income passes a certain 
critical level emissions start to fall. This inverted U-shaped relationship between emissions 
and income has been dubbed the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). 
The discovery of this potential relationship triggered substantial research efforts in this area, 
theoretical as well as empirical. The theoretical literature has focused mainly on the 
assumptions required with respect to technology/preferences and emissions (Lopez, 1994; 
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Selden and Song, 1995; McConell, 1997; Andreoni & Levinson, 1998; Kriström 2000) for an 
EKC relationship to exist. However, the bulk of the empirical literature differs substantially 
from the theoretical. In general the empirical models are a reduced form type using cross-
country data over relatively short time periods. A typical empirical model specifies emissions 
as a nonlinear function of income, income distribution, and a number of country specific 
characteristics such as population density, trade intensity and openness to trade (see Grossman 
and Krueger, 1991, 1995; Stern, 1998).
1 One conclusion from these studies is that openness 
seems to be beneficial to the environment.
2 Another conclusion from more recent studies is 
that using mean income may lead to biased results due to skewed income distributions. 
Instead the use of the median income is proposed (see Stern, 1998). According to Torras & 
Boyce (1998) and Bimonte (2002) an increase in equity, measured by the Gini coefficient, 
shifts the EKC curve leftwards, implying a turning point at a lower income level. Heerink et 
al. (2001) on the other hand get the opposite result for several environmental indicators 
analyzed on a cross-section of different countries. Thus, according to their results there may 
be a trade off between income equality and environmental quality. More importantly they 
conclude that this effect may be due to a strictly concave pollution-income relation at the 
individual level. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we provide a discussion of how the 
household pollution-income relation may affect the aggregate relation and lay out the basis for 
our structural model. In section 3 and 4 we discuss in greater detail how consumption patterns 
and emissions are linked, as well as providing the modeling framework and a description of 
the data used in the analysis. Results from the econometric model are presented in section 5, 
along with an empirical analysis of the pollution-income relationship. The paper ends with 
some concluding remarks in Section 6.  
2. Pollution and income 
It is obvious that consumption will give rise to emissions of various pollutants. This in turn 
implies that any change in prices, income, or preferences that affects the consumption bundle 
will also have an affect on pollution. Essentially, there are two possible effects; an income 
                                                 
1 It may be questioned whether models of this kind should be denoted “reduced form” models. The reason is that 
a right hand shock (policy or other) affecting pollution probably affects income as well. 
2 For a survey of the empirical literature in this area, see Stern (1998), or Panayotou (2000). 
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effect and a substitution effect. Thus we would in principle be able to express pollution from a 
specific household as: 
n i y f y x y x y x g E i i k i i i , , 1 ), , ( )) , ( , ), , ( ), , ( ( 2 1 K K = = = p p p p    (1) 
where Ei is emissions of the pollutant from household i, xj(p, yi)  is consumption of good j as a 
function of prices p = [p1, p2,…, pk] and income yi. g is the function that maps consumption to 
emissions.  
Thus, a change in income for a household will result in a change in emissions, E, via a change 
in the composition of the consumption basket. Aggregating over the n households gives: 
[ ∑ ∑
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where  ∑ = =
n
i i y n y
1 ) / 1 ( , i.e. the average income per capita. 
The second term on the right hand side of (2) indicates the degree of non-linearity of the 
household reduced form function f. Thus, if the household pollution-income relationship is 
non-linear, income distribution, as well as the income level, matters for aggregate pollution. 
Suppose that f is a strictly convex function. Then the second term in (2) is positive which 
means that a redistribution of income towards equalization would reduce the value of the 
second term, and hence also average emissions per capita (see Figure 1a). The opposite holds 
true if f is strictly concave, an increase in equality would increase aggregate emissions (see 
Figure 1b). 
An illustration is provided in Figure 1. Consider two households, one poor (y1) and one rich 
(y2). Given income distribution y
1 we see that average emissions are 1 E . The effect on 
pollution of a redistribution from the rich to the poor, resulting in income distribution y
2, thus 
depends on the curvature, as can be seen from Figures 1a and 1b. 
































Figure 1. Household and aggregate emissions. 
From equations (1) and (2) it is clear that we cannot determine the curvature of the household 
pollution-income relation a priori since the curvature depends not only on the relation 
between consumption and pollution, but also on how consumption is affected by a change in 
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PROPOSITION 1 
Given that ∂g/∂xij ≥ 0 for all j, it follows that a sufficient condition for a positive pollution-
income relationship is that all goods are normal goods, i.e. if all goods have a non-negative 
income elasticity. 
Proof: 
Follows directly from equation (4), and that sij > 0 and pj > 0. 
It should be pointed out however that this is not a necessary condition. Thus, given that ∂g/∂xij 
≥ 0 for all j, a necessary condition for a downward-sloping relationship is that at least one 
good is an inferior good. 
The curvature of the pollution-income relation can then be expressed as (suppressing the 
































































ε    (5) 
From (5) we see that the curvature depends on the shape of the pollution function g, as well as 
the income elasticity for each good, and the budget shares. 
PROPOSITION 2 
If (∂g/∂x1)/(1/p1) = …=(∂g/∂xk)/(1/pk) = Φ > 0, and ∂εj/∂y = 0, j = 1, …, k, then the 
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Proof: 








1 ε . Since Φ  > 0 (a) is true. 
Differentiating   with respect to y, and putting ∂ε/∂y = 0, we get  1 = ∑ j j j s ε














ε , which proves (b) 
If  (∂g/∂xi)/(1/pi) ≠ (∂g/∂xj)/(1/pj) for any i, j = 1, …, k, and/or ∂εj/∂y ≠ 0, for any j = 1, …, k, 
then the pollution-income relationship can have a positive or negative slope, and be concave 
or convex even if the pollution function, g, is linear (∂
2g/∂xi
2 = 0, i = 1, …, k). Thus, we can 
conclude that the sufficient conditions for a linear and positive pollution-income relationship 
are very restrictive and are probably never fulfilled in practice. We can also conclude that the 
curvature of the pollution-income relationship can take any form, depending not only on 
preferences, but also on the g-function. 
3. Modelling framework 
In order to empirically assess the curvature of the household pollution-income relationship we 
can either estimate a reduced form relation, denoted f in equation (1) for each pollutant, or 
estimate a structural model for consumer demand and link this to an “emission module”, 
denoted  g in equation (1). In any case, however, we need data on emissions, but in the 
structural case we also need data on consumption and a pollution function for each good. Here 
we have chosen the second approach for several reasons. One is that we are not only 
interested in the relation per se, but also in the driving forces behind the relation, i.e. whether 
a specific pattern is mostly driven by g, or by preferences. Another reason is that a structural 
approach enables us to trace changes in emissions due to an income change back to changes 
in the consumption basket. If we use a reduced form approach, neither of these objectives can 
be met. However, as pointed out, the structural approach is demanding in the sense that we 
need data on how an individual household allocates its budget, and on what the emissions will 
be under different allocations.  
The data we have in this case comes from the Swedish Family Expenditure Survey (FES) 
1984, 1988, and 1996. In the FES, households are asked to record their expenditures on non-
durables such as food, clothing and public transportation during a four-week period. For some 
commodities such as petrol and heating the households report their annual expenditure. Apart 
from real consumption and income, the data include various household characteristics, such as 
age, family size, and residential location.  
Since the data on consumption includes only expenditure on non-durable goods, we implicitly 
assume that each household’s utility function is weakly separable in durables and non-
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durables, which means that the consumption decision can be modelled as a two-stage 
budgeting process. In the first stage, disposable income is allocated between durables and 
non-durables. In the second stage, the household decides the allocation within the non-durable 
group, given the total allocation to this group. Here we will only model the second stage. A 
shortcoming of this approach is of course that changes in income will also affect consumption 
of durables, and hence emissions. Thus the results here may be viewed as short-term results. 
Next we have to consider an appropriate framework for the demand model at the 
microeconomic level.  It is clear from the discussion above that our framework should be as 
flexible as possible in order to encompass a wide range of preferences, while at the same time 
obeying the constrains originating from the budget constraint and utility maximization. One 
possible candidate is the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980) which 
has a flexible functional form. However, the AIDS model is linear in expenditure, which is a 
very restrictive assumption. In fact it is very common in microdata that demand patterns vary 
considerably across households with different levels of income, even when controlled for 
variations in household characteristics. Banks et al. (1997), for example, found that 
expenditure on some goods is non-linear in total expenditure (or income) while expenditure 
on others is linear. Similar results were found by Ghalwash (2006). In the previous section, 
we showed that the shape of the pollution-income relation depends on derivative of the 
income elasticity with respect to income, which stresses the importance of including non-
linear effects in our demand model. To handle non-linear expenditure effects we employ a 
quadratic extension of the AIDS model, the so called QUAIDS model (Banks et. al. 1997).
3 
Then, given the QUAIDS specification we can write the system of demand equations, in 
budget share form, as: 
[] [], / ln / ln ln
2
1
ijt t it it jt t it it jt
k
m
jt jm it jt ijt P y P y p s υ γ + ′ + ′ + + ′ = ∑
=
d δ d β d α     j = 1,…,k, (6) 
where sijt = pjtxijt/yit is the budget share for good j in household i and period t, is the price of 
good j, and y
jt p
it is household i’s total expenditure on the goods m = 1,…,k. Household i’s 
characteristics are represented by the column vector dit, and the corresponding parameter 
vectors are denoted αjt, βjt, and δjt.
4 The last term, υijt, is an error term reflecting unobserved 
(for the researcher) variation in taste. 
                                                 
3 The specification used here deviates from Banks et al. in the sense that we use the same price index as deflator 
in the linear and non-linear terms. 
4 It is, of course, straightforward to also include household specific effects on the part containing the price. 
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Worth noting in equation (6) is that the price of the goods are equal across households in any 
given time period t. This means that, since we will estimate the cross-sections separately, the 
price will be a constant in the regressions, and hence can be included directly into the 
intercept term α. The system of demand equations to be estimated then becomes a system of 
Engel curves, i.e. 
[ ] [ ] , / ln / ln ~ 2
ijt t it it jt t it it jt it jt ijt P y P y s υ + ′ + ′ + ′ = d δ d β d α   j = 1, …k   (7) 
Differentiating equation (7) with respect to lny, we get 











which enables us to write the income, or expenditure, elasticity as: 
[] [ 1 / ln 2
1




d δ d β ε ] ,       j = 1, …, k  (8) 
The non-linear income effect on the budget share in equation (7) then implies that the income 
elasticity is a linear function of income. Furthermore we see that the income elasticity and its 
relation to income can vary between different types of households.  
Given estimates of the parameters in our demand model, we can estimate the effect of a 
change in income on demand for the various goods. Then, given a pollution function related 
to each good, this in turn enables us to calculate total change in emissions. Here we will focus 
on three different emissions; carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx). Furthermore, we assume that emissions of each substance are a linear function of 
consumption.  Emissions from each good are then defined as:
5
j jm jm x E ⋅ =θ       (9) 
where xj is the real consumption of good j, and θjm is the emission of substance m per unit of 
real consumption of good j,
6 for m = CO2, SO2, NOx
                                                 
5 The household index and time index have been suppressed to spare us from notational clutter.  
6 The emission coefficient θi, measure the direct emissions from the household’s consumption of heating and 
transport. For all other goods, the emission coefficients measure the indirect emissions from the household’s 
consumption, i.e. the indirect emissions include the emissions from the production of the goods that the 
household consume. 
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θ ,  m = CO2, SO2, NOx   (11) 
4. Data 
To estimate the demand model we use pooled cross-sectional data from the Swedish Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES) of 1984, 1988 and 1996, comprising in all about 10000 
observations. FES is a comprehensive microdata survey on household expenditure, income 
and characteristics. For the choice of consumption of non-durable goods we aggregate 
household expenditure into eight goods (food, beverages, heating, petrol, other transportation, 
recreation, clothes and other non-durable goods), and link emission data to each type of good. 
It is very important to achieve data compatibility between the three surveys. There were some 
differences in the classification of goods and in household characteristics. To overcome these 
problems we aggregated expenditures in homogeneous goods following survey definitions, 
and used the same methodology for demographics by defining new variables containing the 
same household characteristics in the three surveys.  
Table 1 summarizes the changes in the expenditure share for each good between 1984 and 
1996, along with the 1996 share of three different emissions; carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx). As shown, household expenditure for food, 
beverages and clothes has been fairly stable over time, although there is a weak negative trend 
in the food share. However, the share for heating and other transportation both decreased 
slightly between 1984 and 1988, while approximately 17% of the household expenditure went 
to heating in 1984, this share had declined to 16% in 1988 and to 9% in 1996. Finally, the 
table also depicts a simultaneous rise in the budget share of both petrol and recreation 
between 1988 and 1996. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of budget and emission shares of eight types of good. 
Percentage of total expenditures and emissions. Emission intensities are in kg/1000 SEK. 
  Budget share  Emission share 1996  Emission intensities 
  1984 1988 1996 CO2 NOx SO2 CO2 NOx SO2
Food  35.0 28.0 31.0 8.4 15.1 10.8 19.80 0.02 0.18
Beverages  4.0 4.0 5.0 0.5 0.6 0.7 7.27 0.01 0.04
Heating 17.0  16.0  9.0 29.1 9.2 50.9 178.56 0.23 0.28
Petrol  6.0 5.0 8.0 44.7 51.3 13.2 292.34 0.06 1.48
Other  transp.  6.0 5.0 3.0 4.3 8.2 2.5 118.16 0.05 1.09
Recreation 3.0  4.0  10.0 2.4 4.3 4.5 13.90 0.02 0.13
Clothes 9.0  9.0  10.0 1.0 1.2 1.5 6.71 0.01 0.04
Others  20.0 29.0 24.0 9.6 10.1 15.9 8.67 0.01 0.05
Sum  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0      
Note: The emissions from transport and heating are direct, whereas the emissions from all other goods are 
indirect 
Concerning the budget shares and emission shares in the 1996 survey, Table 1 shows that 
petrol, with an expenditure share of 8%, is the good with the largest contribution of both CO2 
emissions (45%) and NOx emissions (51%). Compared to the emissions of CO2 and NOx, the 
SO2 share for petrol is much smaller (only 13%). One reason for the relatively low emissions 
of sulfur dioxide from petrol is the SO2 tax on petrol, which has led to a move from petrol 
with high to low sulfur content. In fact, the table reveals that heating has the largest share of 
sulfur dioxide emissions, amounting to about 51%. 
From Table 1 we also see that food consumption, with 31% of total expenditure, generates 
relatively large emissions of sulfur dioxide and NOx. In relation to its share of expenditure, 
recreation also constitutes a relatively large share of the emissions of sulfur dioxide and NOx. 
Household characteristics may affect consumer behavior with respect to these eight goods, 
and hence also emissions. There are basically two different ways to consider different 
household characteristics in the model estimation (Pollak and Wales, 1992). The first 
technique is to consider the sample as a whole and use different dummy variables to capture 
different household characteristics. The second is to divide the sample into homogenous sub-
samples depending on household characteristics. In this paper, we follow the first approach. 
The variables relating to household characteristics include three dummy variables for the 
cases when the household has one child, two children, or more than two children less than 18 
years of age, and five regional dummy variables for the six census regions in the surveys
7. In 
                                                 
7 To avoid perfect collinearity we dropped a variable from each set of dummy variables.  
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the estimation, we use total expenditure rather than income because expenditure better reflects 
permanent income. 
5. Estimation results 
In this section we present some of the estimation results from the demand model. Concerning 
estimation we have, in principle, two approaches to follow. The first is to estimate each 
equation separately using ordinary least squares. The second is to estimate the equations as a 
system using seemingly unrelated regressions. We have chosen the latter, mainly motivated 
by the belief that errors between equations are correlated, hence gaining some efficiency. 
We start the analysis by testing the functional form for the expenditure system in order to 
decide whether the non-linear expenditure term should enter the model or not. Table 2 shows 
the results of this test.    
Table 2: Likelihood-ratio tests for non-linearity. 
  1984 1988 1996 
Non-Linearity  110* 190* 141* 
* Non-linearity cannot be rejected at the 5% level. 
The results in Table 2 indicate that we can reject linearity for the whole expenditure system. 
According to the test results and specification in equation (7), the demand system for the eight 
goods is estimated by using the SURE technique (Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Equations). Tables A1-A3 in the appendix provide estimates of the parameters of the model. 
Given the parameter estimates, income elasticities can be calculated according to equation (8). 
Table 3 presents the resulting income elasticities, together with their standard errors. The 
elasticities in Table 3 are evaluated at the mean budget shares and the mean total expenditure 
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Table 3. Estimated income elasticities. 













Food  0.79 (0.01) 0.70 (0.01) 0.66 (0.02) 
Beverages  0.90 (0.04) 0.63 (0.05) 0.84 (0.07) 
Heating  0.59 (0.03) 0.27 (0.03) 0.71 (0.05) 
Petrol  0.77 (0.02) 0.68 (0.03) 0.67 (0.05) 
Other  transport  1.34 (0.04) 1.25 (0.05) 1.77 (0.25) 
Recreation  1.49 (0.05) 1.65 (0.04) 1.91 (0.08) 
Clothes  1.56 (0.03) 1.34 (0.03) 1.34 (0.06) 
Other  goods  1.27 (0.01) 1.42  (0.006)  1.02 (0.02) 
Note: Standard errors within parentheses. 
Table 3 reveals that all goods were normal goods over the various cross-sections, since they 
had non-negative income elasticity. Further it shows that food, beverages, heating and petrol 
seems to be necessities, i.e. they have income elasticities lower than one, whereas other 
transport, recreation, clothes and other goods appear to be luxuries, since they have income 
elasticities that are higher than one.
8
Table 3 also reveals relatively low income elasticity for heating in 1984 and 1988, and for 
food in 1996, whereas recreation seems to have become monotonically more income-elastic 
over time. 
Regarding the change in income elasticity over time, we can conclude that the income 
elasticities for food and petrol were decreasing between 1984 and 1996. On the other hand, 
those for heating, beverages, other transport and other goods were decreasing between 1984 
and 1988, but increasing between 1988 and 1996, whereas the income elasticity for recreation 
was increasing monotonically between 1984 and 1996.  
Pollution – Income Relationship  
To analyze the EKC hypothesis at the household level we must empirically derive the 
pollution-income relationship stated in equation (1) using the parameter estimates in Tables 
A1-A3 and the emission data. Given an empirical version of equation (1), it is straightforward 
to calculate the slope and curvature of the relationship. However, applying Proposition 1 
reveals directly that the slope of the pollution-income relationship is positive for an average 
                                                 
8 These results support the results of Ghalwash (2006). 
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household. According to the results in Table 3, all goods are normal goods, i.e. the average 
income elasticity is positive for all goods, which is a sufficient condition for a positive slope 
according to Proposition 1. Thus we can conclude that a (small) rise in household income will 
give rise to an increase in the household’s emission of sulfur, nitrogen oxides, and carbon 
dioxide. Here it should be pointed out that this is valid under the assumptions that the 
technology is “fixed”, i.e. the emission intensities do not change, and that the prices remain 
unchanged. These may be plausible assumptions for marginal changes, but they are more 
questionable for large changes in income.  
The second issue is related to the curvature of the pollution-income relation. Since the 
sufficient condition for a linear relationship stated in Proposition 1 is not fulfilled, the results 
in Table 3 cannot be used directly to reveal the curvature. However, by using the estimation 
results in table A3 in the appendix in equation (6), we can calculate the curvature at an 
arbitrary point. Table 4 presents the result of this calculation at the mean for the budget shares 
and the mean income. For all three pollutants the results suggest that the relation between 
pollution and income is non-linear and concave. Based on this we can conclude that pollution 
is increasing with income, but at a decreasing rate, for all three pollutants. This result is valid 
at least in the neighborhood of the point of evaluation (at the mean of the data). Concerning 
the issue of an EKC, the results here do not rule out the possibility of an EKC at the 
household level. 
Table 4. Curvature of income-pollution relations, evaluated at the mean.  






One implication of the results in Table 4 is that the aggregate pollution-income relationship 
will depend on income distribution. Due to the concave relationship, according to Table 4, a 
redistribution of income from high-income households to low-income households, ceteris 
paribus, will increase emissions of all three pollutants. Thus, the results here do to some 
extent support the findings of Heerink et al. (2001) and Huang (2005).  
Figure 2 presents the pollution-income relationship for an average Swedish household, in 
order to illustrate the pollution-income relationship for non-marginal changes in income. It 
shows that the relationship is monotonically positive within the range of the actual income 
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distribution. Moreover it can be seen that the concavity is more pronounced for CO2 and SO2, 
compared to NOx. Figure 2 also illustrates that mean pollution over all households, ) E ( , is 
lower than pollution evaluated at the mean income ) (y E . This implies, as stated above, that an 
increase in income equality will increase aggregate emissions of all three pollutants. 
The concavity property of the pollution-income relationship follows from the magnitudes of 
the income elasticities reported in Table 3, in combination with the emission intensities 
reported in Table 2. From Table 3 we have that the income elasticities for the most emission 
intensive goods are lower than one, whereas less-emission intensive goods, such as recreation, 
have income elasticities higher than one. Thus, an increase in income will lead to a more than 
proportional increase in consumption of the low-intensity goods, and less than proportional 
increase in the high-intensity good. Taken together this implies that emissions are increasing, 
but at a decreasing rate. However, due to the restrictions we have imposed, the simulations in 
Figure 2 should be viewed as illustrations rather than predictions. Perhaps the most serious 
restriction is that the emission intensities are fixed and independent of income. A more 
realistic setting is that income growth, due to for example technological progress, also affects 
the emission intensities, and hence also shifts the curve downwards and changes the 
curvature. If we interpret the income growth in Figure 2 as a result of technological progress, 
the resulting pollution-income relation may perhaps be viewed as a “worst case” concerning 
environmental effects. Another reason as to why a fixed intensity is restrictive is that an 
income change may give rise to substitution within our commodity groups, and hence induce 
a change in emission intensities. Thus, a fixed emission intensity is valid only if there is no 
substitution within the groups, or if the emission intensities are similar for all the goods within 
the commodity group. 
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Figure 2. The pollution-income relationship for an average Swedish household. 
Figure 3 presents the household income-pollution relationships in different regions. The 
relationship is evaluated for an average household in four of the regions. Here we see a clear 
pattern in the sense that the relationships are less concave for a typical household in 
Stockholm than  in the rest of the country.
9 Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 3, it  is 
more  
                                                 
9 An exception though is NOx, for which the relationship is almost linear for the northern rural area. 
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Figure 3. The pollution-income relationship for an average household in Stockholm, the rural 
south, in northern major towns, and in the rural north. 
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likely that an EKC type of relationship will exist in northern towns and rural areas for CO2 
and SO2 compared with NOx since the pollution curve bends down as income becomes 
sufficiently high. One implication of this pattern is that what matters is not only income 
distribution in the usual sense, but also the regional distribution of growth. Thus, if we wish to 
test the EKC hypothesis on the aggregate level we have to consider both of these factors. 
 
Income distribution and aggregate pollution 
One conclusion from the above discussion is that the individual, or household, pollution-
income relationship is non-linear, which in turn implies that the aggregate relationship 
depends not only on aggregate income but also on how income is distributed. To illustrate this 
we will investigate how a change in the income distribution we observe in our data would 
affect aggregate emissions, or emissions per capita. To do this we assume that income 
distribution follows a lognormal distribution, i.e. lny ~ N(m, s), where m is the mean and s the 
standard deviation. Given this distribution we can write the mean (μ) and standard deviation 






= μ , 
2 2 2 2 2 s m s m e e
+ + − = σ  
Given our data we can estimate m and s as the mean and standard deviation of lny. Figure 4 
displays the empirical distribution for y in 1996 showing that this empirical distribution has a 
shape typical of a lognormal distribution. We see also that the distribution in Figure 4 
corresponds to a Gini coefficient of 0.33.
10
                                                 
10 The Gini coefficient is a measure of inequality, and takes a value between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to 
perfect equality (everyone has the same income) and 1 to perfect inequality (where one person has all the 
income, and everyone else has zero income). The Gini value obtained here differs to some extent from other 
estimates of the Gini coefficient. The reason is that the Gini coefficient in this case correpsponds to the 
distribution of consumption expenditures on non-durable goods for this particular sample. According to the 
United Nations WIDER database (http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm) the Gini coefficient for Sweden was 
0.27 in 1996, which should be compared to 0.39 for the USA. Given a lognormal distribution the Gini coefficient 
can be calculated as G = 1 ) 2 / ( 2 − Φ s , where Φ is the standard cumulative normal distribution (McDonald, 
1984) 










































































































































































































mean y = SEK 118 000





Figure 4. Distribution of expenditures on non-durable goods in the 1996 household survey. 
 
To illustrate the effect on aggregate emissions from a change in income distribution we 
change the value of s in the lognormal income distribution. However, in order to keep average 
income unchanged we adjust the value of m.
11
Table 5 displays the results from three simulations. The scenario with superscript 0 refers to 
the outcome at the observed s, whereas 1 is a low variance scenario (s
1 = 0.5·s
0), and 2 is a 
high variance scenario (s
2 = 1.5·s
0). In each scenario we sample 30 000 observations from the 
scenario-specific income distribution and calculate the emissions of each substance according 
to equation (10). We repeat this 20 times and calculate the average emissions. 
 
Table 5. Income distribution and effects on aggregate emissions. Simulations assuming a 
lognormal income distribution. 
  Low variance  Reference   High variance 
S  0.30 0.60  0.90 
σ  52 716  78 087  100 304 
y   119 000  119 000  119 000 
Gini  0.23 (-30%)  0.33  0.39 (+18%) 
CO2 (1000 kg/cap)  6.93 (+6.3%)  6.52  6.01 (-7.8%) 
                                                 
11 Since 
2 / 2 s m e y
+ = , we have that  , 0 5 . 0
2 2 / 2 / 2 2
= + =
+ + ds e dm e y d
s m s m which gives us that dm = -0.5ds
2 
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SO2 (kg/cap)  5.35 (+4.5%)  5.12  4.88 (-4.7%) 
NOx (kg/cap)  33.70 (+4%)  32.40  30.96 (-4.4%) 
 
From Table 5 we see that, as expected, a higher degree of inequality will lead to a decrease in 
total emissions, and vice versa. We also see that the emission effect is most pronounced for 
CO2. These results raise several interesting questions related to the Environmental Kuznets 
issue including to what extent income equalization during a growth path counteracts a 
possible reduction in emission growth among the rich part of a population. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
The analysis in this paper is motivated by the recent literature emphasizing the importance of 
income distribution for the aggregate relation between pollution and income. The main 
finding from previous studies is that if the micro, or individual pollution-income relationship 
is non-linear, then the aggregate pollution, for say a whole country, will depend not only on 
average, or aggregate income, but also on how income is distributed. Our aim was not only to 
determine which conditions on individual preferences and the link between consumption and 
pollution would lead to a linear relationship, but also to empirically assess the relationship. 
We have shown that the sufficient condition for a positive and linear pollution-income 
relationship is a rather restrictive combination of certain preferences and a very specific link 
between consumption and pollution. In fact, it is not very likely that we would observe such a 
combination in practice. Thus we can conclude that is not possible to say much about the 
curvature a priori rather, it is an empirical issue that depends on the particular links between 
consumption and pollution, as well as preferences over the various consumption goods. 
The results from the empirical analysis show that, at least in a close neighborhood of observed 
income and pollution, we can reject linearity for all three types of pollutions, CO2, SO2, and 
NOx. According to our results the pollution-income relationships are all strictly concave. Thus 
the implication is that income distribution seems to matter in the sense that equalization of 
income will lead to higher emissions. Furthermore it has been shown that the slope as well as 
the curvature differ between different types of households, which means that preferences 
differ across households. A consequence of this is that regional distribution will also have 
implications for aggregate pollution under a growth scenario. The basic reason for the 
concavity property can be found in the negative correlation between emission intensities and 
income elasticities for the various goods. Goods with relative high income elasticities tend to 
have relatively low emission intensities, and vice versa. This means that an increase in income 
tends to give rise to a move from high emission-intensive goods to low emission-intensive 
goods. A typical example is consumption of petrol for cars and consumption of recreation. 
Petrol has a relatively low income elasticity (below one), but very high emission intensity, 
whereas recreation has a relatively high income elasticity, but relatively low emission 
intensity. Hence, consumption of petrol will grow at a lower rate than income, and recreation 
at a higher rate, which gives rise to a slowdown in emissions since recreation is less emission-
intensive. 
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The analysis we provide here is admittedly based on several restrictive assumptions, and the 
results should for this reason be handled with care.  Perhaps the most restrictive assumption is 
the fixed emission intensities, at least if the objective is to analyze the effects of large changes 
in income. An interesting prospect for future research is thus to have a more general 
equilibrium type of approach in which the emission intensities are functions of income, since 
income to some extent is related to technical progress which in turn also affects production 
and abatement technology. For such an approach to be possible we would need time-series 
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: Parameter estimates from the demand model in 1984, t-ratio within parentheses. 
 
 Food  Beverages  Heating  Petrol  Other 
transport 
Recreation Clothes 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Ch1= 1 child below 18, Ch2= 2 children below 18, Ch3= more than 2 children below 18, R1 = Stockholm, 
R2=Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns northern areas. 
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Table A2: Parameter estimates from the demand model in 1988, t-ratio within parentheses. 
 Food  Beverages  Heating  Petrol  Other 
transport 
Recreation Clothes 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Ch1= 1 child below 18, Ch2= 2 children below 18, Ch3= more than 2 children below 18. R1 = Stockholm, 
R2=Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns northern areas. 
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Table A3: Parameter estimates from the demand model in 1996, t-ratio within parentheses. 
 Food  Beverages  Heating  Petrol  Other 
transport 
Recreation Clothes 





























































































































































































































































































































































































Notes: Ch1= 1 child below 18, Ch2= 2 children below 18, Ch3= more than 2 children below 18. R1 = Stockholm,  
R2=Gothenburg/Malmö, R3= major towns, R4=southern areas, R5= major towns northern areas. 
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